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With the demand for more energy supplies, concern over federal
reserved minerals has increased. The author, Mr. Mall traces the major
federal legislation concerning reserved minerals, the rights and liabilities
created by the reservations, and the damages recoverable by surface
estate owners. Finally, the author examines recent and proposed
changes to the reserved minerals law which shft the emphasis on
ownership of rights from miners to land owners.

FEDERAL MINERAL RESERVATIONSt
Loren L. Mall'"

T

1974 federal legislative proposals to either ban or
strictly regulate surface mining of coal are the result of
a long-standing struggle between western land owners and
miners who are both interested in the federally reserved minerals under the surface. The dispute dates back to the early
1900's when public lands in the western states were homesteaded by surface entrymen while the subsurface minerals
were reserved by the United States for future mining and
removal.
HE

The inevitable conflicts between the owners of surface
and mineral estates have usually been settled on a practical
basis. Prior to 1974, the law placed mineral owners in a
strong position, but the opposition of surface owners has been
so troublesome that mineral owners have often opted for the
expediency of paying the surface owners for their cooperation. Now, however, the nation's relentless consumption of
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minerals promises to change the status quo. Current plans
to strip mine for coal in the West have heightened the controversy by threatening considerable destruction of the surface. The surface owners have been able to enlist the support
of groups interested in the use of the land such as developers
of residential and commercial subdivisions and environmentalists. The mineral owners are supported by energy and
mineral consumers. Faced with the growing controversy,
both houses of Congress recently passed legislation which
would have either banned or severely restricted the surface
mining of the coal deposits reserved to the United States.1 If
such restrictions on surface mining of coal are enacted, the
new law will probably be extended to all other minerals.
The new legislation would have removed a considerable
quantity of federally reserved coal deposits from mining.2
This seems unwise at a time when this nation is experiencing
unprecedented demands for fuels and other minerals. On the
other hand, careless mining of the reserved minerals would
cause considerable harm to the lands mined as well as to the
people and wild life associated in various ways with those
lands. In recognition of these harsh realities, the mining
industry is developing surface mining techniques which only
temporarily disrupt the environment and do not cause permanent harm.
The present statutory framework which governs surface
use and mineral developmcnt of the federally reserved coal
deposits will not be totally altered by the new legislation.
Other minerals are not yet affected. It is therefore useful to
view the present controversy in light of its statutory and historical context. This article will analyze the separation of
1. The Senate passed its version of the bill in 1973. S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). Senator Mansfield of Montana was easily able to add an
amendment during floor debate which would have totally banned surface
mining of federally reserved coal deposits where the surface is privately
owned. 119 CONG. REC. 18, 770-78 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973). The Rouse bill
H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) was approved in July of 1974. It
would have required the surface owner's consent to the mining of reserved
The conference
coal deposits. H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 709(b).
bill was vetoed by President Ford, but similar bills are expected in the next
Congress.
2. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 121
(1970). See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
PuBuc LAND STATISTICS table 17, 46 (1972). See table at 119 CONG. REC.
18758 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973) for coal deposits by state.
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the mineral from the surface estate by the original federal
legislation, the rights and liabilities created by the reservations, the damages recoverable by the surface owner according to the statutes and judicial decisions, the status of the
reserved minerals as public lands, and the increasing use of
private contests to eliminate mining claims from those surfaces. Finally, current state legislation and the proposed federal law will be reviewed.
BACKGRO-UND

Statutory Severance of the Minerals From the Surface
The United States government created two separate legal
estates in large areas of the western lands. One is comprised
of the surface while the other includes the sub-surface mineral deposits. Historically, this severance can be traced to
the English common law by which the Crown retained the
gold and silver from grants of the land.' Accordingly, a rental on these precious metals was normally reserved by the
Crown under the American Colonial Charters. The Continental Congress thereafter reserved a one-third interest in
all gold, silver, lead and copper mined on the public lands
opened to settlement under the Land Ordinance of 1785.'
Prior to 1846, a variety of scttlement -acts either reserved
minerals from agricultural grants or denied preemption
rights to occupants of mineral lands. After 1846, however,
the preemption and homestead acts allowed the minerals to
pass with patents to the land.' Passage of the minerals was
not authorized by the settlement acts but occurred despite
the statutes. The settlement acts excluded known mineral
lands from agricultural entry and patent. Conversely, the
mining laws were the only legislative authority for the acquisition of mineral lands. Unfortunately, the classification
of land as mineral during the settlement period was unscien3. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 1.1 (1960). For a concise history of retention of minerals in public land in the United States, see Bate, Mineral
Exceptions and Reservations in Federal Public Land Patents, 17 ROCKY MT.
MIN L. INST. 325, 328-34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bate].
4.

P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 701 (1968)
after cited as GATES].

[herein-

5. Id. at 706-7; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 1.24 (1960).
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tific since it depended on surface observations.' Because of
the failure of classification, vast tracts of mineral lands in
the West had passed to private owners by 1900.
Congress would not act to prevent further loss of the

mineral wealth of the nation at a nominal price." President
Theodore Roosevelt was an activist, and supported by a tide
of national conservation sentimcnt, he halted this practice in
1906. Ile withdrew large areas of the public domain thought
to be valuable for coal from all forms of entry.' President
Taft withdrew suspected petroleum lands from all types of
entry in 1909.' This dramatic halt to western settlement compelled Congress to legislatively reopen the public domain
to agricultural entry and acquisition.
In order to save the minerals for the public while allowing agricultural settlement, President Roosevelt had urged in
1907 the amendment of the homestead laws to reserve the
minerals from surface patents.1" Both he and his successor,
President Taft, continued to make withdrawals while Congress debated the point. 1 Finally, Congress acquiesced and
adopted legislation which severed the mineral and surface
6. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 1.24, 3.7 (1960) for a discussion of
the homestead acts and a brief description of other public land laws under
which valuable minerals passed with land grants. The mining laws were
intended to be the only method for acquiring mineral lands. United States
The classification of land as mineral
v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918).
usually depended upon the affidavit of the entryman, the notes of the
surveyor as to mineralization he had seen, data from the field offices
of the United States Land Department and occasional private challenges to
agricultural entries. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.1 (1960). Understandably, mineral classification dependent upon this evidence was a colossal failure. Since an agricultural patent carried with it all minerals which
were subsequently found, Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669 (1914),
vast amounts of the mineral wealth of the nation passed into private
ownership under the agricultural laws contrary to the language of the
statutes.
7. GATES, supra note 4, at 509. Individuals also acquired western mineral
lands through the purchase of railroad grants, state school sections and
through various other settlement acts and public land laws. Id. at 480, 49091.
8. GATES, supra note 4, at 726-27. Approximately 66 million acres in the
West and Alaska were withdrawn from all forms of entry by President
Roosevelt's action. On December 17, 1906, the withdrawal orders were
modified to prohibit coal entries only.
9. Over 3 million acres of lands thought to be valuable for oil were withdrawn. Id. at 733.
10. Id. at 728; 41 CONG. REC. 2806-8 (1907).
11. GATES, supra note 4, at 728.
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estates and insured the flow of settlers to the West."2 This
legislative scheme, which still exists today, provides for granting patents of the surface but reserves various minerals to
the United States subject to the right of qualified persons to
prospect, mine and remove them.
The first two of the agricultural entry statutes allowed
surface entries on coal lands. The Coal Lands Act of March
3, 190913 provided relief to good faith entrymen who had
entered agricultural lands which were later withdrawn from
entry as coal lands. The entryman was allowed to complete
his settlement, but he received a patent which reserved rights
to the coal. The Coal Lands Act of June 22, 191014 provided
alternative relief by opening withdrawn coal lands to agricultural entry subject to a reservation of the coal. Both statutes reserved all coal to the United States together with the
right to persons authorized under federal law to prospect
for, mine, and remove the minerals.
By these Acts and the Pickett Act of 1910s, Congress
reopened the large-scale withdrawals to both agricultural
entry and metalliferous mineral location. After adoption of
the Pickett Act in 1910, however, substantially all of the unappropriated public domain was withdrawn by executive
action from nonmetalliferous mineral location and from agricultural entry by further withdrawals." Congress soon acted
12. See H.R. REP. No. 2019, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1909). The thrust of the
struggle centered on the old philosophy that the government held the public
lands in escrow pending their final disposition to private parties. It was
eventually replaced by a new national ethic holding that the public lands
are public resources to be held in perpetuity in the public interest. E.
PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PuBLIc DOMAIN 313

(1951).

13. Coal Lands Act of March 3, 1909, 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1970).
14. Coal Lands Act of June 22, 1910, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1970). A reservation
of coal under either the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 or 1910 will be set forth
in the patent in the following words:
[R]eserving, also, to the United States all coal in the lands so
granted, and to it, or persons authorized by it, the right to prospect for, mine, and remove coal from the same ...
15. Pickett Act of 1910, 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-43 (1970). The Pickett Act itself
provides that land withdrawn under its provisions continues to be subject
to mining location. See note 19 infra for the numerous other statutes which
also provide for the granting of surface patents and the reservation of
minerals.
16. GATES, supra note 4, at 736.
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again to reopen the petroleum lands to agricultural entry by
adopting the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914."
The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 allowed entry for
agricultural purposes under the homestead or desert land
laws to lands withdawn or classified as valuable for phospate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas or asphaltic minerals. The Act
provided for a patent to the surface and reserved the particular minerals for which the land had been classified as mineral. In order to provide more acreage to ranchers on arid
western lands, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 191618
was also adopted. It increased the homestead allotment from
160 or 320 acres to 640 acres. It eliminated the problem of
classifying lands entered under its provision as agricultural
or mineral. The 1916 Act simply provided for a qualified
patent which reserved to the United States all minerals in
lands homesteaded for stock-raising purposes.
Despite the success of Congress in reopening the petroleum land to agricultural entry by these and other public
land laws,' 9 Congress could not agree for several years on a
17. Agricultural Entry Act of July 17, 1914, 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-23 (1970).
Sodium and sulphur were added to the reserved minerals by a March 4,
1933 amendment. 30 U.S.C. § 124 (1970). See GATES, supra note 4, at 740
for a brief discussion of the legislative history of the 1914 Act. A patent
reservation under the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 will be stated as
follows:
[A]nd excepting and reserving, also, to the United States all the
oil and gas [or other specified nonmetallic minerals] in the lands
so patented and to it, and persons authorized by it, the right to
prospect for, mine, and remove such deposits from the same upon
compliance with the conditions, and subject to the provisions and
limitations of the Act of July 17, 1914 (38 Stat. 509).
18. Stock-Raising Homestead Act of Dec. 29, 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970).
A reservation of minerals under this Act will be set forth in the patent in
the following language:
[E]xcepting and reserving, however, to the United States all the
coal and other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same
pur-uant to the provisions and limitations of the Act of Decemoer
29, 1916 (39 Stat. 862).
19. For a useful compilation of the later statutes which sever the mineral estate
from the surface, see Bate, supra note 3, at 368-406. A similar listing is
contained in Twitty, Laws of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally
Destroy the Surface in Mining Operations, 6 tKocKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 49 t,
513-14 (1960). [hereinafter cited as Twitty]. Since adoption of the StockRaising Homestead Act in 1916, most of the disposal acts authorizing the
private acquisition of public lands have reserved all minerals. The few exceptions make specific grants of various minerals for various purposes. 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.23 (1960). See a discussion of Lsome of the
statutes. Id. §§ 3.28-3.40. The term "public land laws" is ordinarily used to
refer to statutes governing the alienation of public lands and is distin-
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system which would reopen them to nonmetalliferous mineral entry." Finally Congress enacted the Mineral Leasing
Act of 192021 as the only politically acceptable course. The
Act established an entirely different system for the acquisition of petroleum minerals than the location system for
other minerals.2 2 The 1920 Act had the effect of legislatively
withdrawing from mineral location all oil, gas and petroleum
lands of the United States and subjecting them to leasing."
The nonmetalliferous minerals subject to leasing include
those reserved from surface patents as well as those owned
by the United States where no surface patent has been
granted.
The Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910, and, more importantly, the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the StockRaising Homestead Act of 1916 operating side by side, allowed agricultural settlement of much land throughout the
West. Although these acts have not been expressly repealed,
their effectiveness was largely ended by the Taylor Grazing
Act of 1934 which brought homesteading on the public domain
to a halt.2"
guished from both "mining laws," referring to statutes governing the mining of hard minerals on public lands, and "mineral leasing laws," a term
used to designate that group of statutes governing the leasing of public
lands for gas and oil and other nonmetalliferous minerals. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 989 (1965).
20. GATES, sup'ra note 4, at 741.
21. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1970).
22. For a brief legislative history of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, see 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 1.28 (1960). It is probably significant that
the mineral shortages now facing the country occur primarily among the
leasable rather than the locatable minerals.
23. Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 588 (D. Colo. 1956), aff'd, 239
F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1956). The Act provided for the leasing of lands for
potash, coal, phosphate, oil, gas and nitrates. These minerals have been
called the "fuel and fertilizer minerals." Davis, Multiple Uses of Public
Lands, 1 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 495, 497 (1955).
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970). Congressman Taylor from Colorado was the
legislator who championed the Grazing Act of 1934 so well that the Act
is known by his name. Eighteen years earlier, he had also succeeded in
bringing the Stock-Raising Homestead Act ot 1916 into law. Tylor's
efforts in 1934 effectively repealed the 1916 Act which he had brought to
life. Taylor was consistent, nevertheless; his legislation in both 1934 and
1916 reflected the positions of the cattlemen whom he represented. Taylor
had sponsored the 1916 Act as necessary to bring more homesteaders to the
West, even though he admitted it would stop the free use of the public
range by the large stockmen who were charged neither fees nor taxes. Actually, the 1916 Act enabled many cattlemen who had previously homesteaded
to acquire additional public land by further homesteading. GATES, supra
note 4, at 516-17.
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By 1934, the public range was overgrazed and in danger
of permanent injury. Both cattlemen and conservationists
sought new legislation to stabilize the livestock industry and
to save the land from erosion."5 The cattlemen also wanted
to protect their own interests." In response to these needs,
Congress enacted what has become known as the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934. The Act is an important conservation
measure because it stopped the uncontrolled overgrazing
which was seriously damaging the public range.2 7 It also had
the effect of repealing the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916 as well as the other major surface entry laws.2" The
Act accomplished that end by withdrawing most of the remaining unoccupied public lands from agricultural entry.
Since adoption of the Taylor Grazing Act, no entry can be
made under the vaxious settlement laws until land is classified as suitable for the purposes of those laws.2 9
The Taylor Grazing Act, like many of the public land
laws enacted since 1916, allows the acquisition of surface
rights in public lands. Classification of the land for the
particular purpose of the surface entry is first necessary.
The Act provides that surface patentees take their patents
with a reservation of all minerals to the United States.3 The
Taylor Grazing lands withdrawn for classification as well
as those which are patented remain open to mineral location."1
Persons who are qualified under federal law may enter to
prospect for locatable minerals. Locators and persons who
acquire federal mining permits or leases may mine and remove minerals. In both cases, payment is required to the
surface owner for "damages caused to the land and improve3 2
ments thereon."
The immensity of the problem resulting from separation
of estates is apparent in the number of federal patents which
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See generally GATES, supra note 4, at 607-34.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 2.49 (1960).
Id. at § 1.31.
GATES, supra note 4, at 612-13.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.2 (1960). The original withdrswal was accomplished with the aid of executive orders which were made and then
confirmed by legislative smendment to the Act. Id.
30. 43 U.S.C. § 315g(c) (1970).
31. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315f, 315g(d) (1970).
32. 43 U.S.C. § 315g(d) (1970).
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reserved minerals and the amount of surface acreage affected.
As of 1972, 165,709 original entries had been made under the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act affecting 70,362,406 acres of
land.3" A significant number of these entries did not result
in patents, but the number of failures is not available. As of
1972, surface patents with minerals reserved to the United
States had been issued under the various surface entry acts
affecting 62,872,663 acres of land.34 The acreage thus reserved is as large as the state of Wyoming." Over 62 percent of the total mineral reservations or 39,201,523 acres, reserve all minerals, while 25 percent or 16,213,948 acres, reserve oil and gas only. Various combinations of minerals are
reserved on the balance of the reserved acreage.3 Accordingly, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act with its reservations of
all minerals was by far the most widely used surface entry
statute. In Montana, where the public outcry for federal
legislation to protect the surface owners from strip mining of
coal is now the greatest, approximately twelve percent of the
state is subject to federal reservations of minerals under
private lands. The percentage is approximately the same in
Wyoming. 7
Surface Damages
In order to appreciate the severity of the potential conflicts which Congress so casually created by severing the
surface from the minerals without careful analysis or technical study,3" it is helpful to consider the type of damage which
a surface owner will normally assert as a consequence of
mineral exploration and development. Farmers and ranchers
frequently resent a prospector's mere entry as if it were unauthorized and a trespass.3 " After entry is gained, the landowner becomes more apprehensive as he observes mineral
33. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DFP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS 58 (1972).
34. Id. at 46.
35. The total acreage of Wyoming, the 9th largest state, is 62,343,040 acres.
Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 46.
37. 119 CONG. REC. 18776 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973) (remarks of Senator Metcalf).
38. GATES, supra note 4, at 511.
39. For a vivid illustration of this point see Ary and Morgan, Problems of
Access to Public Domain, State and Fee Lands "From Shotguns to the
Courthouse," 15 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.

INST. 481-84
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exploration. Exploration may well be conducted by core
dills, leaving behind a substantial number of drill holes and
cuttings. Once mining activities are begun in earnest, the
farmer would tell you that the miner's drilling site and
operations are:
... taking far more land than reasonably required,
that the newly constructed roads for heavy equipment are dividing the field so that the mowers will
have trouble, that the roads will create low spots in
which water will collect and sour the meadows, and
will alter his irrigation pattern, that the culverts in
the road will plug and necessitate annual cleaning,
that the surface water where confined by culverts
will wash away topsoil, that fences will have to be
built to keep cattle out of the mud pits, that the
lessee is using all the water that is now needed for
crops or livestock...o
The mineral operator may want to construct and maintain pipelines, telephone and electric lines, storage tanks,
ponds, roads, plants, buildings, equipment, and to remove trees
or to level the ground. In the course of such activities, some
of the surface, crops, grass, forage, shrubs and trees, fences
and other improvements will be damaged. When mineral
operations cease, drill holes, large pits, ponds, ditches,
roads, utility lines and debris may be left behind. Deep
trenches and spoil piles may remain. The physical scars to
the surface may be substantial. It is an abhorrence of these
wasting practices which has stirred the curxent national controversy and fueled the drive for a congressional ban or
severe limitations on surface mining.
Statutory Interpretations Versus Deed Interpretations
Before examining the mineral reservations more closely,
the ground rules of statutory construction must be considered.
The conflicting interests of the surface owner and the mineral
owner necessarily result in conflicting interpretations. Surprisingly, only a few court decisions construing government
40. Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND & WATEz L.
REv. 49, 50 (1970).
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mineral reservations are available. Many courts have construed private deeds which sever the surface estate from the
minerals, but these cases do not fully apply to government
reservations.
Patent mineral reservations are construed according to
the purpose for which the legislative body granted the surface
and reserved the minerals. Therefore the statute authorizing
the patent controls the reservation if the patent language is
erroneous or even if the reservation is omitted from the
patent.4 On the other hand, private mineral severances are
construed according to the specific intent of the parties as
shown by the language used in the deed.4 2
Public legislation is construed broadly in favor of the
government which made the grant; no rights pass by implication.4 3 Conversely, ambiguities in private deeds reserving mineral rights are construed strictly against the grantor, who is
also normally the draftsman."
While the intent of the legislative body or the private
parties is sought in both government patents and private
severances, and in both depends largely upon the language
used, the intent is determined according to different principles. Legislative intent is sought in the history of the legislation as recorded in the legislative record, consisting of the
41.

The patent is controlled by the statute. Swendig v. Washington Water
Power Co., 265 U.S. 822, 832 (1924) (patents issued without a reservation
did not convey what the statute reserved) ; Proctor v. Painter, 15 F.2d 974
(9th Cir. 1926) (a patent which would seem to convey minerals because
there was no language of reservation nevertheless did not include minerals
since Congress had not authorized their disposition) ; c.f. United States v.
Price, 111 F.2d 206 (10th Cir. 1940) (since patent was regular on its face,
the court would not go behind it to review the facts). Price supports the
inference that if the government had sought to cancel the patent rather
than to construe it, the court would have looked to the facts and determined that the minerals were reserved if the patent was issued under the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act.
42. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972).
43. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 358 U.S. 112 (1957); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 20 F. Supp. 427, 453 (S.D. Cal. 1937) (the Government
does not assume the attitude of a mere seller of real estate) ; United States
v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1973), appeal docketed, No.
74-1574, 9th Cir., Jan. 11, 1974.
44. Martin v. Knight, 290 Ala. 171, 275 So. 2d 117 (1973); Stewart v. Chernicky,
439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970) ; Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273
S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Alvord, 416 S.W.2d
385 (Tex. 1967).
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conmittee reports, statements by its sponsors, the title of the
statute, successive draft and floor debate, as well as the condition of the country at the time and the purpose of Congress.4" The intent of the private parties must be sought within the four corners of the severance deed, and parol evidence
will only be admitted if the ambiguity cannot be resolved on
the face of the instrument."6 The intent will then be determined within the narrow circumstances surrounding the
transaction and in the actions of the parties before the dispute
arose. 7 Thus, judicial cases construing the meaning of private severance deeds do not apply to government mineral
reservations and are likely to cause erroneous decisions if
used for this purpose."
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES CREATED BY THE RESERVATIONS

Entry Rights
The surface entry statutes restrict a prospector's exploration activities less than they restrict the subsequent acts of
a miner during development. Prospecting requires only a
temporary use of the surface and is now customarily pursued by wide-spaced drilling which is less damaging to the
45. United States v. Union Oil Co., supra note 43, at 1292; Winona & St. Peter
R.R. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885):
The acts making the grants . . . are to receive such a construction
as will carry out the intent of Congress, however difficult it may
be to give full effect to the language used if the grants were by
instruments of private conveyance. To ascertain that intent we
must look to the condition of the country when the acts were passed,
as well as to the purposes declared on their face, and also read all
parts of them together.
See also, United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 150 U.S. 1 (1893);
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 230 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1956), rev'd on
other grounds, 353 U.S. 112 (1957) (railway right of way grants must be
construed by reference to existing circumstances and the Congressional purpose behind the act); accord, Twitty, supra note 19, at 497.
46. Western Development Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955).
47. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, supra note 42.
48. At common law the right to use the surface is an incident of the mineral
estate and does not require payment for damages without express agreement
therefor in the private severance. Twitty, supra note 19. Mr. Twitty
demonstrates, however, that the common law requires subjacent and lateral
support of the surface estate by the mineral estate while the federal statutes do not; accord Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492
F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.50
(1960); Healy, Rights of Mineral Owners In Surface, 1 ROCKY MT. MIN. L.
INST. 85, 92 (1955). Mr. Healy argues that the common law rule allows
mining to consume the surface if that use is necessary in light of the custom of usage of the business or the industry and the standards of the
usual prudent operator.
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surface than close-spaced drilling or other acts employed in
development.
The provisions of the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and
1910 which deal with exploration and disposition of coal have
been superseded by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 which
provides the exclusive means for the disposition of such
lands. 9 The right to prospect and mine federally reserved
coal since 1920 has therefore depended on federal prospecting permits and leases. Both permits and leases provide some
protection to the surface owner since the Secretary of Interior has discretion in fixing their terms.5" The Mineral
Leasing Act expressly includes the reserved coal deposits under patented surfaces within its coverage. 5 The Agricultural
Entry Act of 1914 has also been superseded by the Mineral
Leasing Act in the same manner since the minerals reserved
by the 1914 Act are all subject to leasing. The effect of the
Mineral Leasing Act was therefore to reduce the reserved
mineral lands available for mineral location to lands patented
under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act.
The Stock-Raising Homestead Act gives any qualified
person the right "at all tines ' 5 2- to enter onto patented surfaces to prospect for minerals. The prospector does not have
to obtain the surface owner's consent,5" but he is prohibited
from injuring, damaging or destroying the permanent improvements of the surface owner. The prospector is liable
for all damage to the crops." After its adoption, Congress
subsequently expanded the Act to include damages caused
by a prospector's strip or open pit mining to the value of the
land for grazing.55 Congress probably intended to encourage
49. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1970).
50. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970).
51. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 182 (1970). See the
text accompanying note 64 infra, for a discussion of the protections which
prospecting permits and leases offer. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 did
not supersede the damage provisions of the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and
1910 or of the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914.
52. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).
53. McMullin v. Magnuson, 102 Colo. 230, 78 P.2d 964 (1938).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).
55. Act of June 21, 1949, 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1970) and Act of June 17, 1949, 30
U.S.C. § 54 (1970). Both Acts extend liability to "prospecting for mining
or removal of minerals." The Acts are substantially identical and have been
codified as one pursuant to the wishes of the legislators, S. REP. No. 405,
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prospecting under this Act by not requiring the surface
owner's consent to such entries."
Prospectors prefer to carry out their claim location activities without the prior consent of surface owners. Evidently they reason that the surface owner might attempt to
locate the minerals himself or have his favorite mining associate do so." In prospecting without consent, however, a
miner must be careful to determine which specific statute authorized the patent to the surface in question. If the patent
was granted by the authority of any statute other than the

Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, unauthorized entry
without a federal prospecting permit or mining lease may
well constitute criminal"8 or civil5 trespass under state law.
Mineral developers who own mining claims on stockraising homestead lands seem to understand that they may
not re-enter to mine without some form of approval. Similarly, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act" does not allow re81st Cong., 1st Sess. at 3 (1949). The slight difference in punctuation in
the two basic laws could cause a meaningful difference in damage recovery.
See F. TRELEASE, H. BLOOMENTHAL & J. GERAUD, CASES & MATERIALS ON
NATURAL RESOURCES 717-18 (1965). It is rare for a miner to use surface
mining methods in prospecting, although it is not unknown to make discoveries via open-cut bulldozing.
56. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.50 (1960).
57. Supra note 39, at 492.
58. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-18-13 (1963); WYo. STAT. § 6-226 (Supp.
1973) which provides:
Whoever, enters into or upon the land or premises of another after
being lawfully notified or forbidden to do so by the owner or
occupant, or his agent or servant; or who, being upon the land or
premises of another, shall be lawfully notified to depart therefrom
by the owner or occupant, or his agent or servant, and shall thereafter neglect or refuse to depart therefrom, shall be guilty of
criminal trespass, a high misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall
be fined not more than . . . $500 . . . or imprisoned in the county

jail not to exceed six months . . . or by both such fine and imprisonment.
59. E.g., Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 100 P.2d 528
(1940); appeal denied, 48 Cal. App. 2d 429, 119 P.2d 973 (1941); rev'd,
63 Cal. App. 2d 201, 146 P.2d 256 (1944).
60. The Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 requires either written consent
or waiver, payment of damages as agreed or a bond before development
entry. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970). Locators of mining claims under the StockRaising Homestead Act evidently must obtain consent or post bond as a
condition to re-entry to do annual assessment work. No reported cases can
be found on the point. The Act, however, provides that any person who
has either acquired mineral deposits or the right to mine and remove them
may re-enter with prior approval. Since a locator has by definition acquired
a mineral deposit together with the right to mine and remove the minerals,
his right to re-enter is subject to one of the forms of approval.
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entry to do annual assessment work without some form of
approval. No reported case has as yet distinguished the
unfettered entry rights of mineral prospectors from the prior
consent obligations of mineral developers. 1 It seems likely,
however, that the difference will eventually become apparent
in either a criminal or civil trespass case.
Bonds required under the Stock-Raising Act of 1916 for
re-entry to mining claims are frequently posted in the minimum allowed amount of $1,000. The surface owner may protest, however, and the Bureau of Land Management will require a substantially larger bond if potential damages so
warrant.
Leasing Act Provisions for Surfa.ce Protection
Like the surface entry acts, the federal leasing program
attempts to protect surface owners by requiring a security
bond from prospectors and developers. No pretense is made
that the bonds give adequate protection against destruction
of the surface since the bonds are typically $5,000 to $10,000
for coal leases and $10,000 for oil and gas leases. The surface
owner may protest the amount of the bonds, and the Bureau
of Land Management will require larger bonds if appropriate. Despite the low bond coverages, the Bureau of Land
Management does not release the liability on the bond after
mining operations cease if the surface owner objects. The
Bureau of Land Management, however, does not adjudicate
damage claims; they are left to the courts.
Since 1951, leases issued under the Mineral Leasing Act
have required the lessee to take reasonable steps to prevent
unnecessary erosion of soil and damage to crops, including
forage and timber. Restrictions against pollution of air and
water and prohibitions against damage to improvements of
the United States or private parties are also included. Since
the mid-1960's, leases have protected fossils, ruins and artifacts.
After mining operations cease, restoration of the
surface to its pre-lease condition may also be required, whe61.

1 AMERICAN LAw OF M1IING § 3.50 (1960).

62. The Montana Power Co.,
ing note 63, infra.

72 I. D.

518

(1965)
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ther the surface is owned by the United States or a private
party. Surface restoration includes filling pits, ditches and
excavations and removing debris.
Oil and gas leases issued by the Secretary of the Interior
are subject to stipulations requiring prior approval by the
United States Geological Survey of any drilling or other
operations on the leased lands which would disturb the surface and adversely affect the environment. The lessee must
submit a plan of operation and a map describing the planned
operations. After the Geological Survey and the managing
federal agency prepare an environmental analysis, stipulations restricting surface operations may be made a part of
the lease.63 Because the conditions are discretionary, they
are known as open-end stipulations.
The Secretary of the Interior has adopted a policy of
enforcing the restoration clauses in the leases even where
strip mining for coal has been undertaken on privately patented surface lands.64 This policy has also been applied to the
mining of all other leased minerals. In a 1965 ruling denying
renewal of a coal lease without a clause requiring restoration
of the privately owned surface, the Secretary said:
The undesirable after effects of the single-minded
exploration of mineral resources are well known and
the [restoration] clause is merely a reasonable attempt to achieve some balance between the competing issues of land now and in the future.
That the land is of relatively low value and used
only for grazing and that the cost of restoration
might exceed its value do not justify an exception
from the Department's general policy....
...Although it is true that the United States has a
greater interest in its own lands, it also has a substantial concern with lands of others in which it has
reserved the minerals, together with the right to
prospect for, mine and remove the minerals.6
63. -The restoration clauses in United States leases of minerals are authorized
by 43 C.F.R. § 3132.5 (1970).

64.. The Montana Power Co., supra note 62.
65. Id. at 521.
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Extent of Recoverable Damages
The question of recoverable damages is controlled by
the fundamental rule that the mineral estate is dominant and
the surface estate is servient6
The common law provides,
therefore, that the miner is entitled to make such use of the
surface as is reasonably necessary to the extraction of the
minerals without liability for damages.67 This principle is
of course subject to modification by private agreements or
public legislation. The federal surface entry statutes established a system of private ownership of land with public
ownership of the minerals. The legal Telationship of the respective owners depends not on the common law rules but on
statutory construction since those statutes established and
defined the parameters of the two estates.
The various surface entry statutes, as originally enacted,
did not provide uniform protection to the surface owners for
damage. At one extreme, the Coal Lands Act of 1909 broadly
provided for the payment of all damages caused by mining
activities. At the other extreme, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 expressly limited damage recovery to crops
and tangible improvements. It was not clear which of these
two damage provisions was required by the Coal Lands Act
of 1910 and the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914. They both
required payment for damages to crops and improvements
caused by prospecting, but also referred to recovery of damages caused to the land by mining. The internal inconsistency
of the 1910 and 1914 Acts allowed the inference that payment
for damages of all types was required.s Similarly, it was not
clear whether the 1909 Act required payment for damages to
agricultural improvements only or for damages of any type. 9
66. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928).
67. Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or
Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 Rocxy MT. MIN. L. INST. 411,
413 (1974); Healy, Rights of Mineral Owners In Surface, supra note 48, at
92.
68. 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1970); 30 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
69. 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1970). The intent of Congress in enacting the two Coal
Lands Acts was to reopen the withdrawn coal lands to entry and patent
for agricultural purposes. H.R. REP. No. 2019, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. at 5
(1909) (report of the Committee on Public Lands on the Coal Lands Act of
March 3, 1909) and 45 CONe. REC. 6046-47 (1910) (remarks of Congressman Ferris during floor debate on the Coal Lands Act of June 22, 1910).
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The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 pTovides for the leasing
of nonmetalliferous minerals on lands which had been withdrawn from petroleum entry and on other public lands.'"
Many of these Leasing Act lands had been homesteaded before adoption of the Act or were homesteaded thereafter. The
surface owner therefore holds the surface estate subject to
the mineral reservations of the surface entry acts. 1 Damage
caused by the mining operations of subsequent mining lessees
is compensable by both the provisions of the surface entry
acts and the lease terms required by the Secretary of the
Interior under his discretionary power to prescribe rules and
regulations for the leasing program." Damage caused by
mining operations of prior mining lessees whose rights vested
before the surface entry are not compensable so long as
proper mining operations are conducted."3
The United States has considered the damage clauses of
these statutes in only one case. The decision came in 1928 in
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer.7" In Kieffer, the Court
held that a surface owner under the Agricultural Entry Act
of 1914 was only entitled to payment for damage to crops and
agricultural improvements and was not entitled to damage
to the land itself. This was the damage rule for both prospecting and mining. The Supreme Court ruled that compensation
for damage to non-agricultural improvements is not required
because Congress contemplated entry under the various surface entry acts for agricultural purposes only. 5 The Supreme
Court's rule limiting recovery to agricultural improvements
and crops remains the law of the land, not only as to the
Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 but also as to the Coal Lands
Act of 1910, both of which have essentially the same wording.
Since the express language of the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act limited recoverable damages to crop damage and injury
to tangible improvements, the Coal Lands Act of 1909 was
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66.
30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970).
See text accompanying note 9'7 infra.
277 U.S. 488 (1928).
Id. at 505. There the Court said: "[The wording of the Act] makes it
fairly plain that they refer to damages to 'crops and improvements,' and
the title to the act, coupled with the reference to 'crops' shows that 'agricultural' improvements are the kind intended." See also note 69 supra.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol10/iss1/1

18

Mall: Federal Mineral Reservations

1975

FEDERAL MINERAL RESERVATIONS

the only major surface entry statute which could be interpreted to require paymcnt for damage to the land itself.
Although these damage provisions have recently been
criticized as too narrow," this was the law in 1949 whcn Congress enacted additional legislation in the area. By legislating
in the area without changing the established law as announced
by the courts, Congress has impliedly consented to the interpretation of the courts.7 If Congress thought the damage
provisions wexe inadequate, it could have expanded them,
especially when new damage provisions were added.
The Open Pit Mining Act of 1949 was intended to eliminate the differences in damage compensation provided by the
surface entry statutes in question. The 1949 legislation provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Act of Congress to the contrary, any person who hereafter prospects for, mines, or removes by strip or open pit mining methods, any minerals from any land included
in a stock raising or other homestead entry or patent,
and who had been liable under such an existing Act
only for damages caused thereby to the cxops or improvements of the entryman or patentee, shall also
be liable for any damages that may be caused to the
value of the land for grazing by such prospecting
for, mining, or removal of minerals. Nothing in this
section shall be considered to impair any vested right
in existence on June 21, 1949. 7"
The Conference Report of Congress explained that:
[T]he [bill] is the result of investigation of an increasing number of complaints from stock raising
and other homestead entrymen and patentees which
revealed certain inequities in laws providing for
compensation by mineral-rights holders for damages
to surface rights.
76. Note, Surface Damages From Strip Mining Under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, 50 DENVER L.J. 369 (1973); Note, Protection For Surface Owners
of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 171 (1973)
77. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 263 U.S. 459 (1915).
78. Act of June 21, 1949, 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
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For example, the act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat.
844) requires security and payment to the surface
owner of coal lands for all damages caused by mining
activities. The act of June 22, 1910 (36 Stat. 583)
provides in section 3 that prospectors on coal lands
on which agricultural entries have been made must
provide a bond, approved by the Secretary of the
Interior, for all damages to crops and improvements.
As to actual mining operations, however, the same
section requires that the surface owner must be compensated for damages caused by the mining and removal of coal.
Like protection for surface entrymen on lands
classified as phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or
asphaltic mineral land was provided by the act of
July 17, 1914 (38 Stat. 509).
As to stock-raising homesteads, on the other
hand, where large surface areas are required, section
9 of the act of December 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 862)
limits the liability of a mineral claimant to damages
to crops and injuries to permanent improvements.
In many present-day mining operations, such as
that employed in the production of bentonite, for
example, strip-mining methods are prevalent which
permanently destroy the entire surface value of the
land for grass-raising and stock-grazing purposes.
Thus, the number of head of stock an entryman can
,raise on his homestead is limited to some extent for
both the present and future by the activities of the
holder of the mineral rights on the land.
It is to correct such an anomalous and inequitable situation and to place surface entrymen on all
mineral lands on an equal basis as to compensation
for damages to the surface that the committee has
adopted this report."
The 1949 legislation puts to rest several newly-advanced
arguments. First, the legislation was intended to extend the
79. S. REP. No. 405, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. at 3-4 (1949). The Conference Cornmitte indicated that surface owners under the 1910 and 1914 Acts were entitled to all damages caused by mining, evidently meaning damage to all
improvements. The Committee analysis overlooks the Supreme Court ruling
in the Kieffer case which expressly limited recovery of damages to agricultural improvements. Carpenter, Severed Minerals s a Deterrent to Land
Development, 51 DENvFR L.J. 1, 26 (1974).
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surface owner's compensation under the 1910, 1914 and 1916
Acts from mere damages to crops and agricultural improvements to include damage to the value of the land for grazing
caused by strip or open pit mining, a loss which may have
always been protected by the Coal Lands Act of 1909. In
addition, the 1949 legislation shows that Congress construed
the "all damages" clause of the 1909 Act to mean only damages to crops, agricultural improvements and to the value of
the land for grazing and agricultural purposes. This is a
necessary result if the 1949 legislation is to make the damage provisions of the 1909 Act uniform with those of the
other three Acts. Second, the legislation ratifies the Supreme
Court's decision in the Kieffer case by recognizing the need
.to legislatively extend the damage provisions of the 191_0,
1914 and 1916 Acts past their original limits if damage to
the land was to be compensated. Third, the legislation ratifies
the Supreme Court's ruling that only damages to agricultural
improvements are to be compensated under the various acts
since Congress did not undertake to change that view when
it acted on the Kieffer rule. Fourth, the legislation requires
compensation be paid to the surface owner only for damage
to the value of the land for grazing, even though the grazing
value may not be the full value of the land for a higher use."°
The Open Pit Mining Act provided for damages to the
value of the land for grazing purposes but not for agricultural purposes. Evidently Congress considered agricultural
land values to be protected by the original legislation.
A
court should interpret the acts to include damage to cropraising and other agricultural values of the land in addition
to grazing values. Otherwige, the 1949 legislation would not
accomplish the intended purpose of making uniform the
damage provisions of the various surface entry acts whether
they allowed entry for agricultural purposes or for stockraising. 2
Having examined the legislation for its meaning, it will
be helpful to consider the five judicial decisions on the sub80. But see, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.50 (1960); supra note 76.
81.

1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.51

(1960).

82. Id.
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ject. These cases provide additional guidance as to the respective rights of surface and mineral owners.
The first decision in the 1928 Kieffer case sets out the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal mineral reservations. There an oil and gas lessee under the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 drilled a producing well and staked sites on paxts
of a surface tract for eight other wells. Shortly thereafter,
the patentee under the Agricultural Entry Act platted the
forty-acre tract as a townsite and sold several lots. The
buyers quickly began to construct residential and business
buildings. The mineral lessee brought an injunctive action to
prevent the sales and use of the tract for townsite purposes.8 4
The trial court granted the injunction, and, on appeal, the
Supreme Court approved the injunction. It held that the
Agricultural Entry Act and the Mineral Leasing Act divided
land into surface and mineral estates. The Court said the
surface estate was servient to the mineral estate, that the
owner of the mineral estate had the right to use "so much
of the surface as may be necessary for. .. [mineral] ... operations,"" that the surface owner is not entitled to compensation for the minerals taken or for the use made of the surface, and that the only compensation payable is for crops and
improvements since the language of the Acts shows only agricultural improvements are to be protected. The Court approved the trial court's findings that the use of practically
all the surface was necessary for conducting reasonably efficient mining operations and that the townsites would interfere
with that rightful use.8"
The California Court of Appeals rendered the next judicial decision on the subject in 1940 in Bourdieu v. Seaboard
Oil Corp." A surface owner under the Agricultural Entry
Act of 1914 scored a significant victory in this case. The
court held that a mineral lessee under the Mineral Leasing
Act could only use the surface owner's tract for the produc83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 506.
Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., supra note 59.
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tion of oil and gas from that tract. The lessee owned several
leases on adjoining lands and was operating the various tracts
as one field. The lessee had used the Bourdieu land for compressor plants, storage tanks, shipping pumps, water, gas and
oil lines and roads for production from the entire field as a
unit. The lessee had also injured the Bourdieu grazing lands
by filling gulches and ravines with oil and water products
from lands outside of the surface ownar 's tract. The court
held that the use of the Bourdieu land for the efficient production of oil and gas from other lands was a continuing
trespass for which the surface owner could recover the full
rental value of the land."8 The Agricultural Entry Act, the
court said, only allows use of "so much of the surface as is
reasonably incident to the mining and removal of the minerals therefrom.' " The lessee's argument that separate
operations would cost more and would make operation of the
unit uneconomical was rejected."
The Wyoming Supreme Court handed down the third
decision in the case of Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co. in
1955.91 The surface owners were ranchers who held their surface patents by virtue of the Acts of 1914 and 1916. They
sought damages for a mineral lessee's construction on the
land of three houses for employees. The surface owners also
claimed, inter alia, for recovery for damage to their native
grasses, water supply and livestock. The Wyoming court held
that the mineral lessee was entitled to construct employee
housing and facilities for the separation of water from oil
produced from the Holbrook lands. These activities, the
construction of roads and other operations, were held reasonably incident to the mining and removal of the oil.92 The
court refused to award damages for the loss of native grasses
since it said such grasses were not an agricultural "crop. "3
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently affirmed this line of cases in two decisions, one in 1973 and
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 429, 119 P.2d 973, 977 (1941).
Id. at 977.
Id.
Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).
Id. at 803.
Id. at 804-06. See the criticism of such an analysis in the text accompanying note 82 supra.
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another in 1974. In the 1973 decision, Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Smith, 4 the Tenth Circuit followed the Bourdieu decision by holding that a mineral lessee may not use a surface
parcel patented under the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914
for mining operations to produce minerals from other parcels owned by other persons. The lessee had been trucking
oil produced from other lands in the unitized field across the
Smith lands to a highway. Following the California court in
Bourdieu, and rejecting the economic benefits of unitization,
the Tenth Circuit approved an injunction against such use.
Another part of the decision significantly improves the
possibilities and economy of mining federally reserved minerals. The Smith lands had been patented to agricultural
entrymen under eleven different patents. The tracts were
subsequently consolidated into one ownership by Smith. The
court held that mineral development had to be conducted separately as to separate surface ownerships, but since the eleven
surface tracts had been combined into one ownership, mining
operations could be conducted on that land without regard to
the original patent boundaries. This ruling is of great importance since many, if not most original western homesteads have been absorbed into large ranch holdings.9" Many
mining operations which would have been impractical because
they lacked the large units necessary for economic production as well as access between tracts as originally patented
will now be possible.
In the 1974 decision, Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp.," the surface patentee was a pipeline company.
The surface entry was for transmission of natural gas, not
for agricultural purposes. The case therefore falls outside
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, 471 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1973). The
case, of course, does not reach the question whether easements for access
and production established on combined tracts terminate upon separation
of the tracts. It would seem that easement rights, once established, would
survive the separation of the surface tracts because of the property rights
in the easement.
95. See GATES, supra note 4, at 497-515, 519-22, 610 n.9.
96. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. Jul. 2, 1974). The
petition was dismissed by agreement of the parties. The agreement required
Transwestern to pay for the full value of the ore which Kerr-McGee
agreed to leave unmined under the station.
94.
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the settlement acts and their statutory framework. The potash lease rights of Kerr-McGee in the Carlsbad Potash Basin
had been acquired in 1954 by leases from the United States
under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The United States
reserved the surface of the land for easements and rights of
way insofar as they did not interfere with the mineral lessee's
mining rights. Kerr-McGee and its predecessor explored
from 1954 to 1965 to determine the location of commercial
potash deposits in the basin. By 1965 Kerr-McGee had constructed a mill and began substantial mining operations
within the basin. Transwestern acquired a right of way
for its pipeline and compressor station in the basin in 1959
and started construction immediately. In 1962, Transwestern
obtained a surface patent from the United States to the
eighty acres on which the compressor station had been
constructed. In exchange for the surface patent, Transwestern conveyed to the United States private grazing lands which
it had acquired, presumably for the very purpose of this
exchange. The exchange was made by authority of the Taylor
Grazing Act. 7
The surface patent was granted subject to the reservation to the United States of all minerals, together with the
right to prospect for, mine and remove such minerals as
authorized. The patent was also subject to rights of prior
permittees or lessees to use so much of the surface as required
for mining operations. In addition, the patent provided that
the surface could be used as necessary without compensation
to the patentee for damages resulting from proper mining
operations.
Transwestern negotiated with Kerr-McGee to leave
enough ore in place to avoid disturbance to the station. Negotiations failed to produce an agreement, however, and KerrMcGee prepared a mining plan in 1971 to mine under the
station. Thereupon Transwestern filed suit. It asked, inter
alia, for a declaratory judgment that its compressor station
97. The decision reports neither the circumstances of the exchange nor the
fact that the Taylor Grazing Act was the authority for it. These facts appear in the record on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Brief for Appellees at 10
n.2, Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra note 96.
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was entitled to lateral and subjacent support. The trial court
denied Transwestern's claims and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
Transwestern's suit. It applied the Kieffer rule and held:
Where, as here, the United States reserves the mineral estate, together with the right to prospect for,
mine and remove the same in a grant of the surface
estate, then is a servitude laid on the surface estate
for the benefit of the mineral estate. Kinney-Coastal
Oil Company v. Kieffer (citation omitted). Applying this standard, we hold that the trial court properly held that Kerr-McGee prevails over Transwestern and that Kerr-McGee was empowered to remove
potash, and if necessary, to subside the surface in so
doing. 8
The Tenth Circuit said no compensation would be payable to Transwestern for its loss of the compressor station
or pipeline, "resulting from proper mining operations.'"
The rationale for the Tenth Circuit's holding is in two
parts. First, Transwestern was fully aware of the prior lease
rights of Kerr-McGee. Transwestern also had been advised,
before it built, that a potash ore body existed under its intended station site and pipeline, and that mining would
probably destroy any facilities constructed there. Second,
the surface patent issued to Transwestern reserved the minerals to the United States; the patent was expressly subject
to pTior lease rights; and the patent explicitly provided that
damages from proper mining operations would not be compensated. The Tenth Circuit therefore held that the Kieffer
rule applied, and that the dominance of the mineral estate
as stated in that case allowed the removal of lateral and subjacent suppoit.
The Transwestern decision does not consider the logical
question whether the patent reservations were proper. Since
denial of surface damages depended on the patent language
98. Id. at 882-83.
99. Id. at 882.
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and the validity of its waiver, it follows that the legality of
the rcservations must be determined. Kieffer established the
rule that the surface uses allowed and the damages to be
paid must be determined by examining the terms of the statute authorizing the surface entry together with the provisions
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.10 The Transwesterncourt
failed even to mention the Taylor Grazing Act which allowed
the surface entry, or much less, to discuss its requirements.
The court merely applied the Kieffer rule without any explanation how that rule, developed under another surface
entry statute, could be properly applied to a Taylor Grazing
Act patent.
The incomplete analysis of the Transwestern court weak.
ens its authority, paxticularly in view of the fact that it is
a case of first impression on the right to remove lateral and
subjacent support. Further, the damages involved were large,
and the language of the Taylor Grazing Act seems to contradict the result. Evidence presented at the trial shows the
costs to Transwestern to rebuild its compressor station and
pipeline elsewhere would range from six to eight million
dollars. 1 ' The Taylor Grazing Act seems to present an obstacle which must be hurdled if damages to the land and
improvements are to be properly avoided. It provides:
When mineral reservations are made by the grantor
in lands conveyed by the United States, it shall be
so stipulated in the patent, and any person who prospects for or acquires the right to mine and remove
the reserved mineral deposits may enter and occupy
so much of the surface as may be required for all
purposes incident to the prospecting for, mining and
removal of the minerals therefrom, and may mine
and remove such minerals, upon payment to the
owner of the surface for damages caused to the land
and improvements." 2
100. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66, at 504.
101. Cf. Brief for Appellant at 41, Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., supra note 96. The Tenth Circuit evidently concluded that the issue
was whether lateral and subjacent support was required. After determining
there was no such requirement, it was unnecessary to consider the question
of damages except to note that damages to surface improvements would
result but would not be compensable.
102. 43 U.S.C. § 315g(d) (1970).
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The requirement of the Taylor Grazing Act to pay damages can be avoided only if the Act is construed together with
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Such an analysis discloses
that the Tenth Circuit's Transwestern ruling was correct.
The Department of Interior has consistently treated surface patentees whose entries are junior to mineral lessees differently than surface patentees whose entries are senior to
mineral lessees. This has been the Department's position
ever since adoption of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. It
was first stated in Carlin v. Cassriel.° . in 1924. The standard
which is applied to subsequent surface entrymen, in effect, requires them to waive any damage rights they may have had
under the statute authorizing their surface patent. The
waiver of damage rights existing under the surface entry
act is authorized by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The
Act gives the Secretary of the Interior discretion, in making
leases, to reserve the right to dispose of the surface of leased
lands under the laws of the United States, but only "insofar
as said surface is not necessary for use of the lessee in extracting and removing the [leased] deposits therein.""0 4 The
Carlindecision held that this part of the Mineral Leasing Act
meant that the rights of a prior mineral lessee are vested and
superior to those of the subsequent surface claimant. It also
Carlin v. Cassriel, I. D. 383 (1924). Based on this decision, the Department
issued Instruction, 51 I. D. 166 (1925), to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office requiring that surface entries be allowed and patents be issued
for Leasing Act lands with the express notation on both that:
The entry is subject to the rights of the prior permittees or lessees to use so much of the surface of the area patented as is
required for mining operations, without compensation to the entryman or patentee for damages to crops and improvements resulting
from proper mining operations.
The Department expressed the hope that, if the surface entry application
and the surface patent are so noted and limited, "the entrymen and their
assigns will at all times be chargeable with notice of their rights, through
expressed limitations founded upon the law and set forth in their grants."
The Instruction also required that non-mineral patents state that the application for surface entry was made pursuant to Sec. 29 of the Mineral
The requirements of the
Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
original 1925 Instruction have been carried forward to this day in substantially the same language. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2093.0-3 to .0-6 (1971). In the
Carlin decision, supra note 103, the homesteader made his entry in 1917
under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, but he did not file his
entry application until 1923. The mineral lessee under a 1921 lease was
therefore deemed to have prior rights which were vested before the 1923
application. The mineral lessee could make proper use of so much of the
surface as was reasonably necessary to mining operations without liability
to the surface owner for damages.
104. 30 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).

103.
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determined that the prior mineral lessee was entitled to use
so much of the suTface as is reasonably necessary to prospect
for, mine and remove the reserved deposits without compensation to the surface claimant for the lessee's use of the
surface."°5
The Interior Department's position and its regulations
based on the Carlin decision are also consistent with the Taylor Grazing Act, notwithstanding the requirement of that
Act that mineral lessees must pay for damage to the land and
improvements. The first section of the Taylor Grazing Act'
relieves prior mining permittees and lessees from the damage
The
requirements set forth in the eighth section of the Act.'
eighth section of the Act, which contains the damage provisions, does not apply, by its own terms, to mineral rights acquired prior to the surface patent.0 8
Viewed in the perspective of the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 and the Taylor Grazing Act, the Transwestern deci105. Carlin v. Cassriel, supra note 103, at 385. The decision said that the
damage provisions of the Stock-Raising Homestead Act were inconsistent
with the right vested in the mineral permittee and therefore were modified
by the Mineral Leasing Act. It was only on this basis that the Secretary
exercised his discretion to allow the agricultural entry.
106. The Act provides in 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1970) that:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed in any way to diminish, restrict or impair any right which has been heretofore or
may be hereafter initiated under existing law validly affecting the
public lands, and which is maintained pursuant to such law except
as otherwise expressly provided in this subehapter....
The substance of this provision was added to the proposed bill by the
Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys "to insure the more complete protection of those now enjoying the use of the public lands." S. REP.
No. 1182 at 9, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). It is clear that the amendment
was intended to protect prior mining rights. Senator Adams, spokesman
for the Committee, explained during the Senate debate of the bill, "In the
drafting of the bill and of the amendments which have been inserted by
the Senate committee, great care has been exercised to preserve all the
existing rights to the prospector [and] the miners." 78 CONG. REC. 11140
(1934). During the debate, Senator O'Mahoney, another committee member, advised the Senate that "Amendments have been added by the committee
. . . to protect every right initiated under any existing public-land law . . .
amendments to safeguard water rights and mining rights". 78 CONC REC.
11144 (1934).
107. 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1970). See text accompanying note 101 supra for the
damage clause.
108. 43 U.S.C. 315g(d) (1970). The damage provisions apply only "Where
mineral reservations are made by the grantor in lands conveyed by the
United States," and only to persons holding rights with respect to "the
reserved minerals." These provisions exclude applicability to mineral
rights acquired prior to the time minerals are reserved by a Taylor Grazing Act patent.
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sion should be considered correct in allowing the removal of
lateral and subjacent support which is necessary to mining
without compensation to the surface patentee. Unfortunately,
the decision is right for the wrong reasons. It remains to be
seen whether the allowance of the removal of lateral and subjacent support will be extended to the statutory framework of
the agricultural settlement laws.
Having reviewed the statutes and the few cases which
have arisen on the subject of surface damages, a few additional conclusions may be drawn about the damages recoverable by surface owners as a result of mining operations. Agricultural or stock-raising surface owners are entitled to damages to agricultural improvements and to the agricultural.
value of the land. Surface owners under the four major surface entry acts discussed here are not entitled to damages for
non-agricultural improvements." 9 Surface owners under any
surface entry statute are not entitled to damages to the land
or to improvements if damage is caused by a mining permittee
or lessee whose rights were acquired prior to the surface
entry. Industrial, commercial and residential developments
should be enjoined from construction when they interfere
with mineral development of the reserved minerals, just as
the Kieffer Court ruled."0 Further, if such improvements
are constructed, there will be no compensation for damages
caused by proper mining activities or absent negligence on
the part of the mining developer. " ' This rule of law is a
definite obstacle to those involved with the spreading growth
of residential, commercial and industrial development on
lands subject to government mineral reservations under the
surface entry statutes. This obstacl-e has been removed in
rare instances by the withdrawal of the reserved minerals
from mineral acquisition by acts of Congress."' Subdividers
and existing communities may also find protection from
federal mining leases by incorporation as a municipality be109. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66; Holbrook v. Continental
Oil Co., supra note 91. See also text accompanying note 75 supra.
110. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66.
111. Note, ProtectionFor Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Minerals Lands,
supra note 76, at 180.
112. See Carpenter, supra note 79, at nn.93-100 and accompanying text for such
federal legislation.
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cause the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 excludes incorporated
cities, towns and villages from federal leasing.1 1 The state
law requirements of population density would have to be
satisfied, however, in order to incorporate.
The surface owners under the various surface entry acts
are not without some protections in the law. The miner is
entitled to use only so much of the surface as is reasonably
required in mining from those lands1 14 and not from lands
owned by others."' The miner may not use excessive surface
area or subject the land to improper activities" and is liable
for negligent mining operations, whether the negligence damages agricultural or non-agricultural improvements. 7 In addition, the miner should be subject to injunctive action in cases
where his activities exceed his rights and threaten permanent
injury, just as the surface owner in the Kieffer case was enjoined from improper activities interfering with the mining
operations. A surface owner's claims of trespass and negligence operate as a powerful deterrent against careless mining
operations on severed estates. Furthermore, the potential of
financial loss resulting from injunction of operation of a
large mine is staggering.
The major surface entry acts discussed in this article are
not altogether clear, at least not without. a study of the cases
which have interpreted the statutes. More recent surface
entry acts do not define the respective rights of the mineral
and surface owners at all. Generally, these statutes merely
reserve the minerals to the United States without explanation. Future judicial decisions may therefore apply either
the common law rules of severed estates or the statutory
113.

30 U.S.C. § 181 (1970).

114. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66 at 504.
115. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, supra note 94; Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil
Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 100 P.2d 528 (1940).
116. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Smith, supra note 94; Bourdieu v. Seaboard
Oil Corp., supra note 115. Both excessive use of surface area and improper
117. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66 at 505. Even non-agriculturactivities are acts of trespass. The measure of damages for lost use of the
surface is the lease value of the surface. Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp.,
63 Cal. App. 2d 201, 146 P.2d 256 (1944). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW oF
MINING § 3.50 (1960).
al improvements would be protected by the tort law. They, like any other
property, are protected from damage by negligence whether or not they were
contemplated by Congress on agricultural entries.
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scheme of the major surface entry acts.11 The Transwestern
decision infers strongly that the statutory scheme will prevail.
The Equity Argument
The respective rights of the mineral owner and the surface owner do not depend on uncertain concepts of equity; the
rights are statutory as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
illustrated in Transwestern. This is an important point because of the new criticism leveled at the Supreme Court's decision in Kieffer."9 The resurrected argument is that the
Supreme Court should have required compensation for damages to all improvements, even non-agricultural improvements, and only failed to do so because of the inequitable
attempt of the surface owner to create a town to stop mining
activities.1 2 This is not an accurate analysis of the decision.
While the relative equities of the case were weighed by the
Court, a careful reading of Kieffer shows that the Court
emphasized potential rather than actual liability of the mineral lessee. The Court recognized there would be liability for
negligence which caused damage to "agricultural improvements or crops. ""' This determination was made so that the
lower court could fix the amount of actual damages and the
security to be provided by the mineral lessee. The Court
measured the mineral lessee's exposure to liability for, the
the sole purpose of determining the prerequisites to re-entry.
Clearly, Kieffer stands for the proposition that a miner may
properly develop a patented surface estate so long as he is
willing to give security against certain potential injuries to
the surface.'2 2
The traditional common law rule did not allow the surface owner compensation for injury to the surface due to
118. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 3.43 (1960). See note 19 supra for the more
recent surface entry acts not discussed in detail in this article.
119. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
120. Note, ProtectionFor Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands,
supra note 76.
121. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, supra note 66 at 504. The surface patent
had been granted under the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914.
122. Id. In the interest of predictability, potential mining entrants should be
able to rely on Kieffer as authority for the proposition that posting security
against negligent operations and agricultural or crop damage is sufficient
to allow proper entry.
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mining operations which removed the underground mineral
deposits.12 The courts have changed this common law rule
in situations where extensive destruction of the surface is
necessary to remove the mineral deposit. In the leading case
of Smith v. Moore,"' the Colorado Supreme Court construed
a private reservation of both coal deposits and the right to
use enough surface as was necessary and reasonable for removing the coal. The Colorado court denied the right to strip
mine the coal without compensation. It reasoned that if the
grantor of the land who reserved the mineral deposit could
consume the surface, without paying compensation, he would
have retained dominion over that which he purportedly conveyed and the grantee would be deprived of the very substance of his bargain. The Colorado court required compensation to the grantee for the full value of the surface estate
which would be destroyed by strip mining.
The Smith v. Moore rule does not apply to the federally
reserved minerals. It is based on concepts of equity while the
federal statutes govern the rights and liabilities of the surface
owner and the owner of federally reserved minerals." 5 Further, the need for the same protection to the owner of private
surfaces overlying federal minerals does not exist. The damage provisions of the federal statutes require compensation
to be paid for the value of the land for agricultural purposes
and for the value of agricultural improvements.' 2 6 These are
the only values of the surface owners which are entitled to protection. 7
The legislative history of the surface entry acts which
has not been discussed in the cases makes it clear that the
Supreme Court in Kieffer correctly limited the damages to
agricultural improvements. In the first place, the word "improvements" has a long history in the public land laws of
123. Supra note 67.
124. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970).
125. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., supra note 43. Congress not only has
the power to legislate concerning the public domain, but it may deal with
the public domain as a proprietor just as a private individual may deal
with his farming property. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954).
126. United States v. Isbell Const. Co., 78 I. D. 385, 393 (1971).
127. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
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this country. Since colonial times, American laws have required payment to those who settled in good faith on the lands
of absentee owners and who were later evicted by the true
owners. 2 ' Payment has been required for "improvements"
to the land such as wells, houses, barns, fences and other agricultural improvements. 12' After the American Revolution,
the principle was enacted into law by several states. Congress
used the same word, "improvements," in an identical sense
in the various preemption acts after 1830 and the homestead
acts by requiring that farm-making "improvements" be constructed as one qualification for a patent to the land."' ° The
House Report on the proposed Stock-Raising Homestead Act
refers to "improvements" as "sinking wells, constructing
fences and buildings, corrals, silos, and such things as will
improve . .. [the] . .. entry for stockraising purposes.'.'

The value of the improvements required under the StockRaising Homestead Act of 1916 was $1.25 per acre." 2 Even
in 1916, that sum could hardly have provided more than the
basic improvements described here. The single meaning of
the word "improvements" in the public land laws for over
two and a half centuries indicates that Congress intended to
use the word in the same context in the various surface entry
acts. Unquestionably "improvements" contemplates nothing
more than agricultural improvements.
Additional support for the judicial rulings that the mineral estate is dominant while the surface estate is servient
appears in the legislative history of the various surface entry
acts. The floor debate over the Coal Lands Acts shows that
Congress was well aware- that the creation of such composite
estates would create disputes between the mineral and sur128. GATES, supra note 4, at 37-38.
129. H.R. REP. No. 35 64th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1916).
were also included in the word "improvements."

Irrigation works

See 45 CONG. REC. 6048

(1910) (remarks of Congressman Gillespie).
The meaning and legislative use of the word "improvements" was a part
of the colonial laws of Virginia in the mid-1600's. Settlers on the wild
frontier often found years after their entry that title to the land was held
by an absent speculator who evicted them. Since the squatter had often
improved the land in good faith with a well, house, fences and other agricultural needs, Virginia legislation required payment by the rightful owner
to the squatter of the 'full value of the improvements. GATES, supra note 4,
at 66-67, 219-21.
131. H.R. REP. No. 35, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1916).
132. 43 U.S.C. §§ 293, 294 (1970).
130.
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face owners "' and that mining might "necessarily destroy
the entire surface of the homestead.""1 4 Congress was compelled to make the severances, despite admonitions, on the
theory that if the "[land] is fit for agricultural purposes it
ought to be farmed.. .""' It was also noted that if the agricultural entryman objected to the mineral reservation, he
could make his homestead upon the vast acreages which were
not subject to mineral reservations.'
Congress also knew the type of surface damage which
surface mining causes. Certainly the technology of surface
mining by open pit or strip mining methods was well known
by 1900. Strip mining is the oldest recorded method of extracting coal and other minerals from the earth.3 7 In fact,
the authorities show that nearly every coal field opened
before 1840 was mined by strip mining practices, then known
as quarrying." 8 Some of the minerals reserved under the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act, such as limestone or building
stone, were customarily mined long before 1916 by opcn pit
methods.13 9
THOSE MINERALS WHICH ARE RESERVED

The Stock-Raising Homestead Act reserved to the United
States "all the coal and other minerals in the lands" as to
which surtace patents were granted. 40 The Taylor Grazing
Act reserved "all minerals." ' It is interesting to discover
that this language does not necessarily reserve all minerals.
Not only is there a dispute as to which substances are mineral,
133. 45 CONG. RFc. 6a44-45 (1910) (remarks of Congressman Robinson during
the vigorous debate on the Coal Lands Act of 1910).
134. 45 CONG. REC. 6046 (1910) (remarks of Congressmen Ames and Ferris).
135. Id. at 6048 (remarks of Congressmamn Mondell).
136. Id. at 6047 (remarks of Congressman Ferris).
137. SURFACE MINING 32, 247 (P. Pfleider ed. 1968); ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL
COAL MINING 6 (S. Cassidy ed. 1973).
138.

H. EAVENSON,

THE FIRST CENTURY AND A QUARTER OF AMERICAN COAL

INDUSTRY, 377 (1942). Congress was familiar with quarry mining on the
public lands as early as 1895. The Act of January 21, 1895, 43 U.S.C.
§ 956 (1970), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to permit the use
of rights of way through the public lands of the United States to any
citizen engaged in mining or quarrying.
139. Twitty, supra note 19, at 518.
140. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).
141. 43 U.S.C. § 315g(c) (1970).
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there is also a dispute as to whether acknowledged minerals
which comprise most of the surface were reserved.
It is settled that oil, gas and related hydrocarbons axe
reserved under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act by the language, "all minerals."... The meaning of the word "mineral," however is not so precise that it can readily be applied
to all other substances. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has said:
"Mineral" is a word of general language, and not
per se a term of art. It does not have a definite
meaning. It is used in many senses. It is not capable
of a definition of universal application, but is susceptible to limitation or expansion according to the
intention with which it is used in the particular instrument or statute. Regard must be had to the language of the instrument in which it occurs, the relative position of the parties interested and the substance of the transaction which the instrument embodies. (Citations omitted)."'
Clay, stone, sand and gravel are among those substances
In New Mexico ex rel.
which fall into the disputed area.
14
State Higkbway Convm'n. v. Trujillo, the Supreme Court
of New Mexico held that gravel was not among the minerals
reserved by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. While the
court conceded that clay, sand and gravel are normally considered minerals, it reasoned that materials which possess no
exceptional characteristics or value which distinguish them
from the surrounding soil are not recognized as "minerals"
in the sense in which that term is used in conveyances. The
court concluded that materials which form part of the surface are not minerals which were reserved by the StockSkeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 633.
Oil shale was also reserved by the use of the word "oil" in the Agricultural
Entry Act of 1914. Brennan v. Udall, 251 F. Supp. 12 (D. Colo. 1966),
aff'd, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967).
143. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir. 1963).
144. New Mexico ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487
P.2d 122 (1971). The Highway Commission of New Mexico took the gravel
material from the stock-raising homestead for use in road construction.
The BLM, claiming ownership of the gravel, issued a permit for free use
of the gravel since it was being used in a federal project. The court held
that the gravel was owned by the surface owner, and that condemnation
and compensation for the taking were required.

142.
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Raising Homestead Act. If the minerals which form part of
the surface were reserved from the grant, the court said the
surface patentee would not own any material on which to conduct his homesteading activities.
Only a few months after the New Mexico decision, the
Department of Interior came to the opposite conclusion on
the same question in United States v. Isbell Const. Co."' The
sand and gravel in this case comprised practically all of the
surface and subsurface to depths between 20 and 600 feet.
The surface estate had been patented to the State of Arizona
with a reservation of all minerals, as required by the Taylor
Grazing Act which authorized the patent."' The Interior
Board of Land Appeals collected the many cases which hold
that grantors cannot be deemed to have reserved those minerals which comprise the surface, without clear and express
language of reservation, because otherwise the grantor would
have retained dominion over that which he purportedly conveyed to the grantee who would be deprived of the very substance of his bargain. Those cases were distinguished because the Taylor Grazing Act required compensation to the
surface owner for damage to the land. The Board therefore
held that a reservation of all minerals to the United States
reserved valuable deposits of common sand and gravel. It
allowed no exception to this rule where those minerals comprise all or substantially all of the land in question because
compensation to the surface owner for damage to the land
was required by the surface entry statute.
The Board said in, Isbell that the Stock-Raising Homestead Act contained a similar indemnity for surface owners.
On this basis, the Board indicated that common sand and
gravel deposits on stock-raising homesteads would also be
considered reserved to the United States.1 47 The contradic145. United States v. Isbell Const. Co., supra note 126.
146.
147.

43 U.S.C. § 315g(c) (1970).
See the criticism of this position in

Carpenter, supra note 79, at 15-16.

The Common Varieties Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-15 (1970), reserved common
varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite and cinders from the
class of locatable minerals. Only if deposits of these materials possess a
distinct and special economic value are they locatable. The Common Varieties Act therefore does not legislatively determine whether these substances
are reserved minerals since locatable minerals under the mining laws are
not the same as reserved minerals under the settlement laws. Carpenter,
8upra note 79, at 14.
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tory views represented by the Trujillo and Isbell decisions
leave this reserved minerals question unsettled. The Isbell
case establishes the Bureau of Land Management position. It
may be a long time before the courts establish a consensus of
theit own or consider reversing the agency rule.
Congress, itself, raised the newest question concerning reserved minerals. When it adopted the Federal Geothermal
Steam Act1 4 in 1970, Congress directed the Attorney General
of the United States to file suit 4 ' in order to obtain a judicial
determination whether geothermal resources were reserved
to the United States by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act.
The Attorney General complied with this mandate and
brought a suit in California entitled United States v. Union
Oil Co.' to determine the ownership of geothermal resources.
The surface owners had leased the geothermal resources to
Union Oil and others who were producing steam. The United
States sought damages and an injunction against the production of the geothermal resources which it claimed were reserved to the United States.
The Union Oil court ruled that geothermal resources
were not reserved by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. The
court reasoned that geothermal resources are primarily superheated water, and that water was not considered a mineral
when the Act was adopted nor has water ever been considered
a mineral under the public land laws."' As a result of the
Union Oil case, the surface owner under the Act is the owner
of the geothermal resources taken from his lands."'
148. Federal Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-25 (1970).
149. 30 U.S.C. § 1020(b) (1970).
150. United States v. Union Oil Co., supra note 43.

151. The court also relied on the position of the Department of Interior that
geothermal resources are not locatable under the mining laws as additional
authority for holding that they were not reserved. It should also be noted
that the Department of Interior holds the position that any mineral extracted with the geothermal steam are minerals reserved to the United
States by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. Id. at 1300 (Appendix A). See
30 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1970). This issue may become important since geothermal waters are often heavily mineralized. At this stage of development
of energy from geothermal resources, the mineralized waters are a
nuisance. As early as 1818, however, geothermal steam at Larderello, Italy
was commercially produced for heating in order to concentrate and remove
the boric acid which occurred in solution in the hot waters. United States
v. Union Oil Co., supra note 43, at 1296.
152. The case is now on appeal to the 9th Circuit and could be reversed in that
court or eventually the Supreme Court.
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The Trujillo court and the Union Oil court have developed a rationale which may guide future questions as to
which minerals were reserved by the Stock-Raising Homestead Act. These two courts have rejected the traditional view
that patents granted under the Act created two separate estates; the surface estate which passed to the patentee and the
subsurface mineral estate which was reserved to the United
States." 8 This traditional analysis leads to the anomalous
result that all of the subsurface would be reserved to the
United States, leaving homesteaders no subterranean water
or subsoil on which to make their stock-raising homesteads.
Instead, the two courts have concluded that the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act reserved only minerals in the land but not all
of the subsurface.5
FEDERALLY RESERVED MINERALS AS PUBLIC LANDS

While all persons who share the miner's viewpoint of the
public land laws are sure that federally reserved minerals are
part of the so-called "public lands," it is difficult to find
direct statutory authority to that effect. No one doubts that
the reserved minerals axe open to mineral entry for exploration and location; the surface entry statutes, themselves, make
that clear. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to know if the
reserved minerals fall within the term "pubic lands" as
used in the Mining Law of 1872... for patent rights and as
used in the Unlawful Inclosures Act.5 for access rights.
There are several reasons to conclude that reserved minerals are part of the public lands. First, the severance statutes expressly provide that reserved minerals are open to
prospecting, mining and removal. These expressly resexved
rights have always been considered by the courts and the
Department of Interior to be subject to the operation of the
Mining Law of 1872 which applies to unappropriated public
153. Skeen v. Lynch, supra note 42.
154. New Mexico ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, supra note 144, at
125; United States v. Union Oil Co., supra note 43, at 1295.
155. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21, 22 (1970); Udall v. Tallman, supra note 19. The mining
laws refer to the statutes which govern the mining of hard minerals on
"public lands."
156. Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §. 1061-66 (1970).
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lands. Second, more specific authority is found in the Congressional act creating the Public Land Law Review Coinmission in 1964.'
That Act defined the term, "public lands" to
include the subsurface resources retained by the United States
in patented surfaces.' 8 Lastly, the regulations of the Department of Interior provide that the reserved minerals are open
to location, thus confirming their status as public lands. The
regulations expressly provide that lands patented under the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act are open to mineral location
and patent.1 5 ' The regulations also recognize the right to
prospect and remove leasable minerals from surface lands
patented under the Agricultural Entry Act of 1914,1"' and
locatable minerals from the stock driveway withdrawals made
under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916"6 and from
reclamation withdrawals made under the Reclamation Act of
June 17, 1902.62
The Department of Interior regulations do not contain
provisions for mineral entry under the many newer disposal
acts which allow patenting of the surface with reservations
157. Act of Sept. 10, 1964, 43 U.S.C. § 1400 (1970):
As used in this subchapter, the term "public lands" includes (a)
the public domain of the United States, (b) reservations, other
than Indian reservations, created from the public domain, (c) lands
permanently or temporarily withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from
private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws,
including the mining laws, (d) outstanding interests of the United
States in lands patented, conveyed in fee or otherwise, under the
public land laws, (e) national forests, (f) wildlife refuges and
ranges, and (g) the surface and subsurface resources of all such
lands. . . . (emphasis added)
158. Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Holmes, Study of Trespass and Unauthorized
Use of the Public Lands of the United States, PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW
COMM'N STUDY REPT. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor
& Holmes] describing public lands which are open to prospecting and location). See also, 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1 (1973) (specifically referring to stockraising homesteads); c.f. Devearl v. Dimond, 62 I.D. 260 (1955) holding that
the minerals reserved to the United States under Stock-Raising Homestead
Act patents were "vacant, unreserved, and undisposed of public lands" under
the statute adding lands to the Navajo Indian Reservation in Utah.
159. 43 C.F.R. § 3811.1 (1973) provides:
Lands entered or patented under the stockraising homestead law
(title to minerals and the use of the surface necessary for mining purposes can be acquired), lands entered under other agricultural laws [where the agricultural entryman will be entitled to a
patent including the minerals] but not perfected, where prospecting
can be done peaceably are open to location. (emphasis added)
The requirement to prospect peaceably or not at all applies only to those
lands on which a homestead entry has been made but not yet completed.
160. 43 C.F.R. § 3813.2 (1973).
161. 43 C.F.R. § 3815.1 (1973).
162. 43 C.F.R. § 3816.1 (1973).
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of the minerals. 6 ' These statutes typically reserve all the
minerals and the right to prospect for, mine and remove the
deposits under the applicable law and according to such
The regularegulations as the Secretary may prescribe.'
tions promulgated by the Secretary for these statutes usually
provide that leasable minerals may be disposed of according
to the leasing laws, but of course, the decision to lease is discretionary with the Secretary and rarely exercised. The regulations usually provide that locatable minerals axe not open
to prospecting or disposition until specific regulations for
those purposes have been promulgated by the Secretary.'
Obviously, the Secretary has not yet elected in these typical situations to exercise his discretionary authority to dispose of the reserved minerals. The Secretary's inaction may
be prompted by a hesitancy to create conflicts with surface
owners. It has been held that Congress may properly delegate to the Secretary the discretion to decide how and to what
extent the reserved minerals under such statutes shall be open
to mineral location. 6
Statutes which authorize the disposition of surface rights
and which merely reserve minerals do not themselves open
those lands to mining entry. 6 ' Specific statutory authorization is necessary to open such lands to mining entry whether
by leasing or location, and such authorization will not be implied in a statute which only reserves minerals. 6 '
Since the term "public lands" properly applies to reserved minerals, the Unlawful Inclosures Act applies to
them also. Even though this Act is not widely understood to
apply, it does offer considerable assistance to miners seeking
access to the reserved minerals. It prohibits interference by
surface owners and others with those who have a right to
enter the public lands:
163. See notes 19 and 118 supra and accompanying text.
164. E.g., Small Tract Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 682a, 682b (1970); Recreation & Public
Purposes Act, 43 U.S.C. § 869-1 (1970).
165. E.g., Small Tract Act, 43 C.F.R. § 2731.6-3 (1973); Recreation & Public
Purposes Act, 43 C.F.R. § 2741.6(e) (1973).
166. Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 362 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1966).
167. Solicitor's Opinion, M-36279 (July 10, 1955).
168. City of Phoenix v. Reeves, 81 I.D. 65 (1974).
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No person, by force, threats, intimidation, or by any
fencing or inclosing, or any other unlawful means,
shall prevent or obstruct, any person from peaceably
entering upon or establishing a settlement or residence on any tract of public land subject to settlement or entry under the public land laws of the
United States, or shall prevent or obstruct free
passage or transit over or through the public lands
One section of the Act makes interference with the right of access a crime.1 70 Another section charges the local United
States Attorney with responsibility to bring a civil suit upon
the filing of an affidavit by a citizen showing violations of
the Act. The federal district courts have jurisdiction of the
civil suits and must give priority to the case over other civil
suits. The courts are to restrain violations by injunctions and
to order unlawful enclosures destroyed within five days if
not removed. 1
Despite the traditional and correct view that the Unlawful Inclosures Act prohibits interference with agricultural
settlement, 1 ' the Act benefits all persons, including miners,
who are lawfully entitled to reach the public lands.17 It has
been applied specifically by one federal court to benefit a
mineral prospector who was prevented from reaching un7 4 The
appropriated public lands to locate mining claims."
interfering parties used "guns, pistols, blows, ropes and
tar"'' 5 to deny passage to the miners. The statute was
invoked by the territorial attorney general, and the offenders
were fined $100 each and sentenced to one year in jail. 6 In
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

175.
176.

43 U.S.C. § 1063 (1970).
43 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
43 U.S.C. § 1062 (1970).
See Comment, Access To Public Lands Across Intervening Private Lands,
8 LAND & WATER L. REv. 149 (1973); Ireland, Stapleton, Pryor & Holmes,
suprC note 158.
Cf. United States v. Rindge, 208 F. 611 (S.D. Cal. 1913).
Hayes v. United States, 101 F. 817 (8th Cir. 1900). The reported case
leaves open the possibility (admittedly quite unlikely before 1900) that
the public lands to which access was denied were reserved minerals under
privately patented surfaces. The record on appeal, however, shows the
dispute concerned access to entirely unappropriated public domain lands.
Record, vol. 114, at 439, Hayes v. United States, id.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 820. The case arose in the Territory of New Mexico. The attorney
general of the territory was a federal officer.
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1959, the Acting Solicitor of the Department of Interior ruled
that the Unlawful Inclosures Act afforded relief to miners
who were denied access over public lands to their mining
claims."7 These authorities should apply with full force to
the reserved subsurface below patented surface lands.
Since the statutes reserved the subsurface for both mineral
exploration and development, entry can properly be enforced
by aid of the Act to explore for unknown mineral deposits as
well as to develop known deposits.
Whether the Unlawful Inclosures Act confers any right
to cross private lands which are not subject to mineral reservations is not settled. The Wyoming Supreme Court held
that such an infringement of private rights would be unconstitutional. 7 s The Utah Supreme Court, on the other hand,
justified the constitutionality of such access right on the basis
that the United States had retained an implied easement to
reach its remaining lands when it made the private grants.'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also recognized the
Act as conferring such access rights. It held the Act was a
defense to a trespass action brought by the owner of private
land against a sheepherder who crossed those lands to get his
sheep to the public range. Unfortunately, the decision does
not consider the constitutional question.'
Certainly the patent provisions of the mining laws' 8
apply to the federally reserved minerals under the patented
surfaces. The law and the regulations make no distinction
between patent procedures for reserved minerals or for minerals where the surface is still owned by the United States.
In the reserved mineral patents, the patentee receives fee
title to the subsurface mineral deposit with the right to
"reenter and occupy so much of the surface thereof as may
177. Rights of Mining Claimants to Access Over Public Lands to Their Claims,
66 I.D. 361 (1959).
178. United States v. Douglas-Willan Sartoris Co., 8 Wyo. 287, 22 P. 92, 97
(1889).
179. United States v. Buford, 8 Utah 178, 30 P. 433 (1892).
180. Mackay v. Uinta Development Co., 219 F. 116 (8th Cir. 1914); accord,
Western Wyoming Land and Live Stock Co. v. Bagley, 279 F. 632 (8th Cir.
1922); Mumford v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n, 261 F. 842 (8th Cir.
1919); Jastro v. Francis 24 N.M. 127, 172 P. 1139 (1913). But see United
States v. Rindge, supra note 173, at 623-24.
181. 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1910).
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be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining
or removal of the coal or other minerals. "'' The rights
granted with the reserved mineral patents necessarily follow
the rights retained by the United States in the statutes allowing surface patents. In mineral patents where the estates
are not severed, the patentee receives fee title to both the
subsurface mineral deposit and the surface within the boundaries of the claim.
To this date, it is a rare occurrence for mineral owners
to take their reserved mineral deposits to patent. In fact,
Bureau of Land Management officials do not recall ever receiving such an application. A patent might enhance the mineral owner's access rights by clarifying his ownership, but it
would not eliminate the interference to operations which
many owners have managed to create. Therefore, owners of
valuable reserved minerals have usually purchased surface
damage agreements or the entire surface estate as more practical than patenting.
PRIVATE CONTESTS

Some landowners whose land is Subject to mineral reservations have not been content to merely support protective
legislation and wait for Congress to take action to protect
their surface estates. A few surface owners have recently
seized the initiative by filing administrative actions in the
Bureau of Land Management to have mining claims on their
lands declared void. 8' The Interior Department regulations
authorize the filing of such a private contest:
Any person who claims title to or an interest in
land adverse to any other person claiming title to or
an interest in such land... may initiate proceedings
to have the claim of title or interest adverse to his
claim invalidated for any reason not shown by the
records of the Bureau of Land Management. Such a
182.
183.

Stock-Raising Homestead Act of Dec. 29, 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970).
The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914, 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-23 (1970) makes a
similar provision. See also, 43 C.F.R. §§3813-14 (1973).
E.g., Sedgwick v. Callahan, 9 IBLA 216, GFS (Min) 27 (1973); Thomas v.
DeVilbiss, 10 IBLA 56, GFS (Min) 35 (1973).
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proceeding will constitute a private contest and will
be governed by the regulations [in the subpart].184
The surface owner clearly has an adverse interest to the
mining claimant since mining operations can damage and
even destroy the surface owner's estate."' This adverse interest assures the surface owner's standing to bring the private contest."8' The private contest is then heard and decided
by the Bureau of Land Management on the theory that such
claims assist the Secretary of Interior in his duty to supervise the public lands." 7
In a private contest, the surface owner typically attacks
the validity of an unpatented mining claim on the basis that
no valid discovery of a valuable mineral has been made.188
Claims have been held invalid in private contests, however,
for failure to validate the location in accordance with the
law, or because staked on land not subject to mineral location at the time of entry.'
The use of private contests to remove mining locations
from the surface dates back at least to 1924.' Those who are
entitled to bring the private contest include surface patentees
or their successors under the various surface entry acts,'92
grazing lessees under the Taylor Grazing Act, 9 ' holders of
special use permits granted by the Forest Service for construction of a dam and spillway on national forest lands,1"4
and agricultural lessees from the surface patentee.'95 The
right to file a private contest extends to any party claiming
an adverse interest in the land on which the mining claim is
located.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

43 C.F.R. § 4.450-1 (1973).
Sedgwick v. Callahan, supra note 183.
Id.; Branch v. Brittan, 50 I.D. 510 (1924).
Duguid v. Best, 291 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906
(1963); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 871 U.S. 334 (1963).
E.g., cases cited note 183 supra.
Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Adams, Contest No. 9945, Arizona 080536 (Unreported dec. Sept. 9, 1966).
City of Phoenix v. Reeves, supra note 68.
Branch v. Brittan, supra note 186.
Sedgwick v. Callahan, supra note 183.
Thomas v. DeVilbiss, supra note 183.
Duguid v. Best, supra note 187.
Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Adams, supre note 189.
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Once the private contest is filed and a prima facie case
of invalidity is made by the surface owner, the burden of
proof rests on the mining claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the test of discovery of a valuable
mineral deposit has been met or that the claims are otherwise
valid. 9 ' The Administrative Law Judge makes a decision
which is subject to administrative appeal to the Secretary of
Interior. 9 ' Mining claimants have not yet succeeded in obtaining injunctions from state courts against the lengthy
appeal proceedings by arguing that they will be deprived of
'
the use of the mining claim for several years. 98
Not all private contests have been successful. Nevertheless, several other actions discussed here have been useful to
the surface owner to eliminate invalid mining claims from
his estate. In self defense, mining claimants of federally
reserved minerals will probably find it worthwhile to carefully validate their mining locations and to rigidly adhere to
the discovery and assessment work requirements.
PROPOSED

CHANGES TO THE RESERVED MINERALS

LAW

The legal status of the federal reserved minerals is awash
in a torrent of change or proposed change. We have considered the possibilities for change which private contests
within the Bureau of Land Management may bring. We
should now consider the changing administrative regulations
which have already effected substantial changes. We will
then consider the recent state legislation and the pending
federal legislation.
Proposed Changes to the Regulations
When Congress adopted the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,
it gave jurisdiction of the leasing materials to the Depart196. Sedgwick v. Callahan, supra note 183.
197. 43 C.F.R. pts. 1840 & 1850 (Supp. 1964).
198. E.g., Duguid v. Best, supra note 187. See also Everett E. Wilder, 14 IBLA
406, GFS (Min) 25 (1974) where holders of a mining claim on lands subject to a patent applicant were not allowed to object in the patent proceeding but were required to file a private contest to litigate the question
whether their ownership was superior to that.of the patent:applicant.
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ment of Interior and made the Secretary of the Interior the
administrator of the leasing program. 9 ' The Secretary has a
wide latitude in administering the lands subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, but of course, his reguacts 0 and his own
latory powers are bound by Congressional
201
regulations which remain in effect.

Under its right to administratively change leasing programs, the Department of Interior virtually ceased issuance
of coal leases as of the fall of 1970 and prospecting permits as
of the spring of 1973.202 In June of 1974, the Department of

Interior published its environmental impact statement on its
new lease program.2° It will reopen competitive lease sales
of what are considered the best coal deposits. The leases
would require environmental safeguards as well as reclamation of the land affected. The program includes federal coal
deposits under both public and private surfaces. The public
will participate in hearings to select the lease sites and will
surely resist leases of reserved minerals under homesteaded
lands. The need for coal is expected to be so great, however,
that no areas can be considered immune from leasing.
State Legislation

Twenty-nine states have enacted legislation of one sort
or another to regulate surface mining, primarily for coal.20'
Among the most recent and perhaps the most restrictive of
the state acts are those of Montana and Wyoming. The two
acts directly affect the mining of federally reserved minerals
in those states.
199. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970); Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., supra note 23.
200. Seaton v. Texas Co., 256 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958); cf. Chapman v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 204 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
201. McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
202. 1 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT-PROPOSED FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROCRAM I-1 (1974).
203. Id. at I-Ia to 1-7; Id. at Vol. 2, IV-74, VIII 134-36.
204. H.R. REP. No. 93-1072, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 61 (1974) (accompanying
H.R. 11500). Both Colorado and Wyoming have for many years had statutes limiting a mineral owner's development of mineral deposits under
surfaces owned by others. The statutes give the owner or occupant of the
surface the right to demand satisfactory security from the mineral operator
for compensable damages to the surface. If it is refused, mineral operations
may be enjoined. COLO. REV. STAT. § 92-24-6 (1963); WYo. STAT. § 30-19
(1957). See Whiles v. Grand Junction Mining & Fuel Co., 86 Colo. 418, 282
P. 260 (1929).
These state statutes apply to federally reserved minerals
as supplemental to the federal legislation.
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Montana adopted its Strip Mining and Reclamation Act
in 1973."'2 The Act established a permit system for strip
mining coal and uranium."' A mining and reclamation plan
must be submitted to the state, and the issuance of a mining
permit depends upon whether the state reclamation standards
can be met."0 7 The Act prohibits prospecting or mining activities on any lands in the state, including federal lands,
without a permit." 8
The Montana legislation requires the surface owner's
consent to nearly all mining activities."' 0 Prospectors, miners
and others contemplating surface disturbance by mechanical
equipment are required to give notice to the surface owner
or those with possessory rights before beginning work. Trail
building is expressly described as surface disturbance, but
all work by hand tools is exempt from the notice and consent
requirements.2 10
The written notice to the surface owner must describe the
locations to be disturbed and must include work and restoration plans. The miner must obtain the written consent of the
surface owner before any mining work, except work with
hand tools, is begun."' No written consent is required, however, where the operations are expressly authorized in a
valid prospecting permit, mineral lease or other agreement.' 1
The exemption of hand-dug discovery pits on federal lands
from notice and consent presumably includes the federally
reserved minerals under privately patented surfaces."
205. MONT. REV. CODES §§ 50-104-.to -1056 .(Supp. 1973). Montana adopted a
chapter on reclamation of mining lands in 1971. MONT. REV. CODES §§ 501201 to -1224 (Supp. 1973). The 1973 legislation also included the Strip
Mined Coal Conservation Act found in MONT. REv. CODES 50-1401 to -1409
(Supp. 1973), and the Open Cut Mining Act found in MONT. REv. CODES
§§ 50-1501 to -1516 (Supp. 1973).
206. MONT. REV. CODES § 50-1039 (Supp. 1973) (permit system); § 50-1036
(Supp. 1974) (removed clay and phosphate from the permit requirement).
207. MONT. REV. CODES § 50-1039(2) (Supp. 1974).
208. MONT. REv. CODES § 50-1041 (Supp. 1974).
209. Landowner Notification Act, MONT. REv. CODES §§ 50-1301 to -1306 (Supp.
1973).
210. MONT. REv. CODES § 50-1302 (Supp. 1973). Discovery pits when dug by
hand tools on federal lands open to mineral entry are exempted from the
consent requirement. MONT. REV. CODES § 50-1304 (Supp. 1973).
211. MONT. REv. CODES § 50-1303(a) (Supp. 1973).
212. MONT. REv. CODES § 50-1305 (Supp. 1973).
213. MONT. REV. CODES § 50-1304 (Supp. 1973). See text accompanying note
157 supra concerning the federally reserved minerals as federal land.
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The Montana legislation makes it a crime to do mining
work without the required written consent. 1 4 Furthermore,
the person who controls the surface where the violation occurs
is granted immunity from liability "for injury to any person
on either owned or leased land.""2 1 The immunity provision
is vague-and ominous. Evidently, it is intended to relieve
the land owner or those in control of any tort liability to
invitees and trespassers resulting from dangerous conditions
on the surface. We can only hope it does not license surface
owners to injure prospectors whom they consider in violation
of the statute.
Wyoming set out new mining controls in its Environmental Quality Act.2 16 Like Montana, the Wyoming Act establishes a permit system which requires prior approval before mining operations are undertaken. 17 The mining permit is to be issued upon state approval of mining and reclamation plans which show that the work will be done in accordance with the regulations and other provisions of the Act." '
During mineral exploration, only open cuts by bulldozer are
regulated.'
During development and mining, however, all
operations are regulated.2 2
Wyoming also requires that applications for a mining
permit for minerals owned separately from the surface estate
must be accompanied by the surface owner's consent to the
operations. 2 1 If the consent cannot be obtained, the Environmental Quality Council is empowered to issue the permit anyway if it finds the mining operations will not "substantially
prohibit the operations of the surface owners. 2 2 2 Whether
consent to enter is given by the surface owner or the state,
the miner must give a bond to the state for the benefit of the
surface owner to secure payment of damages to the surface
214. MONT. REV. CODES § 50-1306 (Supp. 1973)-. The Act purports to make any
such failure a misdemeanor without requiring a willful or intentional
violation.
215. MONT. REv. CODES § 50-1306 (Supp. 1973).
216. WYo. STAT. §§ 35-502.1-56 (Supp. 1973).
217. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.23 (Supp. 1973).
218. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.24 (Supp. 1973).
219. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.30 (Supp. 1973).

220. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.20 (Supp. 1973).
221. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.24 (b) (x) (Supp. 1973).
222. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.24 (b) (x)(C) (Supp. 1973).
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estate, crops or forage and the tangible improvements of the
surface owner.2 '
The legislation adopted by both Montana and Wyoming
in 1973 was the result of considerable agitation by ranchers
and other land owners. 224 These individuals understood very

well the limitations of their surface rights. They sought and
obtained state legislation which gives them something more
than they acquired through their surface patents. Montana
surface owners gained an absolute veto power, in effect,
over access to and the mining of federally reserved minerals.
Wyoming surface owners gained a more limited veto and
protection of their non-agricultural improvements.
The Montana and Wyoming legislation concerning mining of the federally reserved minerals raises some fundamental constitutional questions. The restrictions against mining
the reserved minerals are invalid if the states do not have
jurisdiction over the federally reserved minerals. The minerals are part of the federal public lands until they have
been reduced to private ownership by mineral entry or federal lease. Logic would seem to dictate that the reserved
mineral estate, as federal property, would be subject to federal legislation, and that the overlying surface estate, as private property, would be subject to state legislation. Those
propositions are legally correct so far as they go2. but the
issue is not that simple. Because the estates are inextricably
intertwined, neither legislative authority can regulate one
estate without necessarily affecting the other.
Which authority prevails must be determined by constitutional principles of preemption. Our federal system of
223. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.33 (a) (ii) (Supp. 1973).
224. 119 CONG. REc. 18770, 18776 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973) (remarks of Senator
Mansfield and Senator Hansen, respectively). See Time, April 16, 1973, at
62.
225. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 2 provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.
The tenth amendment reserves to the states dominion over land within the
boundaries of the states. Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 61 P.2d 1276 (1936),
aff'd, 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
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government is based on the fundamental premise that state
legislation which is contrary to valid federal law is unconstitutional since the laws of the United States are the supreme
law of the land.22 If the federal legislation regulatcs a subject constitutionally delegated to Congress, the federal law
has "preemptive capability." 27 State legislation on the subject will be nullified, however, only to the extent Congress
intended preemption.22 Where no such intent is expressed,
a direct conflict between state and federal law requires an
inference that preemption was intended. 29
Certainly federal laws governing reserved minerals have
preemptive capability. Both the means and the end of the
legislative scheme lie within the paramcters of legitimate
federal concern. The subjcct matter is federal land and the
regulation of it is entrusted to Congress."' The purpose of
the regulation is federal whether one perceives the laws as
concerning simply the disposition of federal land or, more
broadly, as furthering interstate commerce.231
There is little room for debate whether the state laws conflict with the federal legislation. The surface entry acts contain relatively explicit provisions for mineral entries. None
226. U.S. CONST. art. V[, § 2:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
227. See Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV.
51 (1973); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146
(8th Cir. 1971,) aff'd m m., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
228. See authorities cited note 227 supra. The earlier view was that "the exercise of federal power was inherently exclusive of any concurrent state
power over any matter reached by the federal act." Engdahl, supra note
227, at 53. The 1872 mining law did not preempt the entire field, and the
states are permitted to elaborate on some aspects of mining where the federal law is silent. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 1.22 (1960). State laws
have dealt principally with location procedures and the amount and proof
of development necessary to hold a mining claim.
229. As the Supreme Court stated in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963):
A holding of federal exclusion of state law is unescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility....
230. See note 225 supra.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8:
The Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.
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of those provisions allows the surface owner to deny mineral
access; in fact, the provisions carefully require approval of
a bond by the Department of Interior or the establishment by
a court of the appropriate damage safeguards if the surface
owner does not consent to mineral entry. The entire thrust
of the surface entry acts is to provide a means for access to
these public minerals which is not subject to denial.2"
Assuming, however, that the state provisions are considered to be merely supplementary to the federal law, an
intent to preempt may be derived from the statutory language
and legislative history of the federal law, the nature of the
subject matter, or from the pervasiveness of the legislative
scheme.' In sum, if the state law stands as an obstacle to
the realization of federal objectives, preemption is mandated. 4 As the Supreme Court has said, a state cannot "afit in using
fect the title of the United States or embarrass'235
disposal.
of
right
its
with
the lands or interfere
Indeed, the new state legislation impedes the national
government's original purpose of reserving the minerals for
the public benefit." 6 A requirement to obtain the surface
owner's consent to mining and the protection of non-agricultural improvements clearly interferes with the federal
program for extraction of the reserved minerals as it was
conceived in 1909 and subsequently applied. 7 Furthermore,
232. See note 239 infra.
233. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd nem. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
234. Id.
Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650-51 (1930) ; James v. Dravo
235. Surplus
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 142 (1937).
236. 45 CONG. REC. 6041 (1910). When Congressman Mondell introduced the
Coal Lands Act of June 22, 1910 to the floor of the House for debate, he
said:
We must separate the surface from the coal in our public coal
lands, or else give up the idea of reserving the coal to the Government, because the coal areas are so extensive that to withhold
these lands from agricultural entry until someone might desire to
purchase them at the coal price would mean to close the door of
opportunity and development in many western regions for generations to come.*
119 CONG. REC. 18772 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973). Senator McClure said:
The rationale for the reservation was that the people of the United
States as a whole should benefit from the ownership of the minerals under the lands, and not just those who acquire title [to
surface lands] from the United States.....
237. Objections were raised to the breadth of the damage provisions of the
Coal Lands Act of June 22, 1910 as unwarranted interference with mineral
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the state law conflicts with the federal law. For these reasons, so much of the state legislation as attempts to grant

surface owners a veto power over entry to and development of
the federally reserved minerals is unconstitutional."'
The argument for validity of the state laws is founded
upon tenth Amendment principles; states have the inherent
right to legislate so as to protect the public health, safety and
general welfare within their boundaries."' It is apparent that
the federal courts are hesitant to imply preemption of state
law in the vital areas of health and safety."4 ' As the Supreme
Court has held, unless there is an express reservation of exclusive jurisdiction by the United States or a ceding of juris' a state has inherent
diction by a state to the United States, 41
power over public lands within its boundaries. 42 Absent the
presence of these two exceptions, the police power of a state
extends over the federal public domain, at least when there
is no legislation by Congress on the subject."' Therefore, so
much of the Montana and Wyoming legislation as requires
the reclamation of mined lands should be considered constitutional.

238.

239.
240.

241.
242.
243.

extraction. 45 CONG. REC. 6044 (1910) (remarks of Congressman Robinson).
By the time the Stock-Raising Homestead Act was adopted in 1916, the
damage coverage provided by it was less extensive.
It is true that the Wyoming law does not allow the surface owner a complete veto power since the state can override a refusal. The state can only
override, however, if it finds that mining operations will not "substantially
prohibit the operations of the surface owners." Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.24
(b) (C) (Supp. 1973). This is a consideration not allowed in the federal
law. It seems to protect even non-agricultural improvements and operations even though the federal laws protect only agricultural improvements and activities. See text accompanying note 79 aupra Since the balance between the competing interests of surface owner and mineral owner
is altered by the Wyoming law, it is no answer to say that state law merely
supplements the protection given the surface owner. Of necessity, such
protection concurrently erodes the rights of the mineral estate, which are
also the subject of federal protection. Where preemption may be fairly
inferred, a state law may not disturb the balance in competing interests as
established by federal law. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,
supra note 233, at 1153-54.
E.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). If an
intent to preempt is sufficiently clear, however, the state interest in health
and safety must give way to the judgment of Congress. See Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 233, at 1153.
Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); State v. Cline, 322
P.2d 208 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 61 P.2d 1276 (1936), af/'d, 302 U.S. 186
(1937).
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 353 (1918).
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Certainly the regulation of mining activities has a direct
effect on the public health, safety and general welfare, as
the House of Representatives committee report on the proposed federal coal mining bill demonstrates. 2 44 The House
report cites the collapse of a mine waste impoundment in
West Virginia in which 124 people were killed and 4,000 left
homeless in 1972. It also reports 11,000 miles of streams in
the East have been ruined by acid drainage from coal mining.
Moreover, the report relates, forests and wildlife have been
destroyed, landslides have occurred, and rivers have been
filled with silt. Surface uses are disturbed for considerable
periods of time. Water tables are affected. These and other
deleterious effects on the public health, safety and general
welfare illustrate the public danger from surface mining
which the state legislation is intended to protect. Accordingly,
a strong argument can be made that the states should be allowed jurisdiction over the reserved minerals by virtue of
their compelling interests so as to impose more restrictive requirements on mining operations than the present federal
laws. This is particularly true where the federal legislative
scheme is old and new mining technology causes more damage
than may have been contemplated when Congress originally
legislated on the matters of access and surface damages.
Whatever the validity of the new Montana and Wyoming
laws, the federal legislation recently considered in Congress
may moot the constitutionality issue. The Senate bill would
totally ban surface mining of federally reserved minerals and
the House proposal would condition mining upon the consent
of surface owners. If either version becomes law, this radical
change will render state legislation merely supplemental.
Both the Senate and House bills go to considerable length to
avoid superseding existing and future state laws which provide more stringent surface mining controls. The Senate bill
also directs that state controls on surface mining and reclamation may supplement the federal law without being declared
42
inconsistent.
244. H.R. REP. No. 93-1072, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 56-61 (1974).
245. S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 611 (1973); H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 207 (1974).
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Proposed Changes By Federal Legislation
It is not startling
altogether ban surface
posits. The Surface
passed the Senate with
ment provided:

to learn that federal legislation may
mining of federally reserved coal deMining Reclamation Act of 19732"
just such an amendment. The amend-

All coal deposits, title to which is in the United
States, in lands with respect to which the United
States is not the surface owner thereof are hereby
withdrawn from all forms of surface mining operations and open pit mining, except surface operations
incident to an underground coal mine.2 4
Should it have become law, the Senate bill would have constituted an absolute prohibition against surface mining of the
federally reserved coal under privately owned surfaces. The
federally reserved coal would simply have been withdrawn
from the federal leasing program.
The Senate bill also contained the seed for extension of
the regulation of strip mining to other minerals. It would
have required the gathering of data necessary to the future
regulation of surface mining of all other minerals.2 4
The thrust of the House bill, H.R. 11500,49 is quite different. It would have required the consent of the surface owner before surface operations to mine the federally reserved
coal could begin.25 9 This idea was considered and rejected in
the Senate as giving away federal rights and providing a
windfall to the surface owner by giving h'm a veto which
he does not have the right to exercise."' The House bill, however, would have given the surface owner the chance to veto
coal mining under his surface land or to demand payment
for his consent.25 2 A resolution of this legislative difference
must be achieved before either bill becomes law.
246.
247.
248.
249.

S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
119 CONG. REc. 18912 § 612(b) (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973).
Id. at 18902 § 102(9).
H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The proposed bill is called the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1974.
250. H.R. 11500, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. § 709(a) (1974).
251. 119 CONG. REC. 18772 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973).
252. The Denver Post, May 9, 1974, at 53, col. 4 (remarks of Congressman
Morris K. Udall, a prime sponsor of H.R. 11500). Rep. Udall said, "We're
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If either approach to the mining of federally reserved
coal under private surface land is adopted, a fundamental
change in our nation's history will have occurred. The existing law will have been overturned, as the Senate recognizes."'
Congress will have reneged on the very basis by which the
major surface entry acts won enactment in the early 1900's."'
The conservationists of that time opposed allowing the
surface entries at all, or at least they opposed the payment of
any damages caused by mining to the surface owners."' Their
stated reasons were that the underground minerals could not
be economically extracted if damage payments were required,
and that the government would be continuing its giveaway
of the public's mineral wealth to homesteaders by requiring
unwarranted payment to them for damages. 6 In practice,
surface owners under the surface entry statutes have usually
been fairly paid for all damages from mining activities, often
considerably more than they are legislatively entitled to receive."' The economic burden of obtaining the surface
owner's consent will result in increased costs to the great
number of fuel consumers and unjust enrichment of a small
number of surface owners; providing them compensation for
something they do not own. 5
The great emotional appeal of a complete ban on surface
mining of federally reserved minerals is understandable, but
we should also note that it will be a complete change in the
present law regarding mining of those minerals. The present
law clearly permits surface mining as well as subsidence of
the surface25 pursuant to the original severance acts.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

going to make some rich surface owners at the expense of consumers who
have to pay higher costs for coal." He also said surface owners would be
protected by the requirements of full restoration of the land to its original
contours after mining operations cease.
119 CONG. REC. 18770 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973) (remarks of Senator Fannin).
Note 12 supra and accompanying text. The 1974 legislation was approved
by Congress after a long struggle in the Conference Committee. The bill
was then vetoed by President Ford.
45 CoNG. REC. 6046 (1910) (remarks of Congressman Ferris).
Id.
Ary and Morgan, 8upra note 39, at 492-95; Davis, Selected Problem Regarding Lessee's Rights and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 Rocxy
MT. MIN. L. INST. 315, 316 (1962).

258. During floor debate on the Senate bill, S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
Senator Metcalf called the requirement of surface owner consent "legal
blackmail." 119 CONG. REC. 18773 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973).
259. See note 39 supra.
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The wisdom of the proposed legislation will ultimately
be for Congress to decide. Pending that decision, it should
be noted that mineral interests which are already vested cannot be destroyed, at least not without just compensation.2 6
As the Supreme Court has said:
[W]hen the location of a mining claim is perfected
under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the
United States to present and exclusive possession.
The claim is property in the fullest sense of the term
and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of the
United States. The right of the owner is taxable
by the state; and is "real property" subject to the
lien of a judgment."'
Thus, the ownership of a mining claim and the right to
remove the minerals according to the laws and regulations
then existing should be considered vested when the location
is perfected. The law regarding removal or disposal of the
minerals could not be changed at that point without affecting
the locator's rights, at least under the existing law.2 82 A valid
mining location, even though unpatented, is a grant in
the
nature of an estate in fee; if that estate is taken by the
United States, just compensation must be paid as required

by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution.'6
260. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930). See also
Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935); United
States v. Etcheverry, 230 F.2d 193 (10th Cir. 1956).
261. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra note 260, at 316.
262. 17 OP ATT'Y GEN. 230 (1881).
263. North American Transp. & Trading Co. v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 424
(1918), aff'd, 253 U.S. 330 (1920). The extent to which the mineral rights
could be infringed without violating the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment is a formidable constitutional question beyond the scope of this article.
Three recent, informative articles on the subject are worthy of study. See
Corker, Limits to "The Petty Larceny of the Police Power", 20 ROCKY MT.
MIN.L. INST . -- (1975); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) ; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Coninents On The Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1165 (1967). The definitive authority on the subject is F. BossntMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). See also, Comment, Land Quality: The Regulation of Surface Mining Reclamation in
Wyoming, 9 LAND & WATER L. REv. 97, 115 & n.134 (1974).
The traditional rule has been that a severe reduction in the profit-making
capacity of property is a taking subject to compensation under the fifth
amendment. See Sax, supra, at 151; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922); Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comn'n, 151 Conn. 304,
197 A.2d 770 (1964). As the concept of private property rights has changed
in recent years, so is there an indication that the judicial approach to
the taking clause may evolve to include both the effect of regulation on
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The location is not perfected, however, until a valuable mineral deposit has been discovered. "4
The point of time when federal mining lease rights vest
is not certain. The administrative law has recognized vested
rights as soon as the lease issues.26" 5 The proposed federal
bills, on the other hand, consider the rights as having vested
only where active mining is underway; inactive leases and
future leases would be subject to the new restrictions.,"'
those regulated, and the effect of absence of regulation on other property
owners and the public at large. See Sax, supra, at 154-59; State v. Dexter,
32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 338 U.S. 863
(1949). Speaking of the case, where two property owners rights are mutually antagonistic, Sax declares:
It hardly seems appropriate, when government intercedes to settle
the conflict, to find that a "taking" has occurred simply because
the uses one owner has formerly been able to make within his
boundaries have been curtailed. The restriction may instead represent a resolution of conflicting demands so as to protect and maintain the uses of other parcels of property within their boundaries.
Sax, supra, at 154-55.
The trend of the law in this direction is apparent in land use cases. For
example, the power of states to impose reasonable reclamation requirements
on surface mining is clearly established. See, Dufour v. Maize, 358 Pa.
309, 56 A.2d 675 (1948); Bosselman, The Control of Surface Mining: An
Exercise in Creative Federalism,9 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 187 (1969). The
Supreme Court also has taken a permissive view of local laws regulating
surface mining. See Bosselman, supra, at 155; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding a prohibition of surface mining below water
table in developed residential districts).
The owner of mineral interests, however, may justly distinguish his
situation from the usual land use regulation case. First, contrary to the facts
in Goldblatt, the land here concerned is largely undeveloped. Furthermore,
the mineral and surface rights are not vested in the same person-a
material difference. Restriction of the mineral rights in the divided ownership context is more apt to constitute a "severe reduction" of the profitmaking capacity. This is a taking under the traditional view, and even
under the modern view, a clearly relevant factor. Finally, and most importantly, the mineral owner should be justified in relying on the present
federal delineation of rights between the surface and mineral owners.
Monies and energy may well have been expended with the expectation that
the mineral interests would amount to something in a legal sense. Consequently, any new legislation, state or federal, which would have the effect
of reallocating the mineral estate to the surface owner should be vulnerable
to a fifth amendment challenge. The argument would not be applicable,
of course, to surface mining legislation directed to the prevention of deleterious effects on other property surrounding the land on which mineral
activity takes place. See Sax, supra, at 164; Binder, Novel Approach to
Reasonable Regulation of Strip Mining, 34 U. PiTT. L. REv. 339 (1973).
264. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 456 (1920).
265. Carlin v. Cassriel, supra note 103. A mineral lessee whose interest is earlier
than an agricultural entry under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act has a
vested right by virtue of the Mineral Leasing Act which takes precedence
over the rights of the stock-raising patentee, and the lessee is not liable for
damages to the land or improvements due to proper mining operations.
The Department of Interior practice is to preserve the vested right by noting
on the agricultural application and patent the prior rights of the lessee.
43 C.F.R. §§ 102.31-.33 (1963). See also Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. KerrMcGee Corp., supra note 96.
266. S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1973) prohibits coal lessees from opening,
developing or expanding surface coal mining operations without a new
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Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court
indicate the courts offer little refuge to miners who might
contend that legislation which substantially denies mining
rights is a taking which requires compensation." 7 That judicial attitude may leave most miners to the tender mercies of
the changing legislation. The effect of the federal legislation
on mining claims will be against mining interests not yet
acquired. The effect, as to federal mining leases, will be
immediate uncertainty. Even if a present lease is considered
a vested interest once it is in effect, the miner will probably
be required to renew the lease in order to complete his operations. The miner is entitled to such a renewal, but the Secretary of Interior has discretion to change the terms of the
lease,2 68 and the new terms may have the collateral effect of
stopping mining by making the project uneconomical.
Mining under prospecting permits presents the same
problem. In the case of coal lands, the Secretary is not required to issue a lease unless there is evidence that the prospecting permit lands contain coal in "commercial quantities."
This requires that the coal can be economically removed." 9
Much coal removal will not be economical if surface mining
is banned either by law, regulation or denial of surface owner
consent. 7 0 Furthermore, the requirements of surface owner
consent in both the present state law and proposed federal
law present difficulties of proof. A title search will be necessary to determine if the persons signing surface leases and
damage agreements have the right to contract on those matters. Studies of the Validity of those agreements will be necessary to determine their enforceability and their compliance
with both the federal legislation and the Montana and Wyo-

267.

268.
269.
270.

permit. Doubt was expressed during floor debate in the Senate that this
requirement was constitutional. It was called either a taking or a breach
of the lease. 119 CONG. REC. 18773 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973) (remarks of
Senator Moss); H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(a) (1974) has substantially the same provisions as the Senate bill.
E.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973). Ranchers whose base
lands, owned in fee simple, were condemned by the United States were not
compensated for the additional value attaching to those lands by virtue of
their location adjacent to Taylor Grazing lands. Only a bare majority of
the Court joined in the holding.
E.g., 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1970) (federal coal leases).
30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970).
119 CONG. REc. 18775 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973) (remarks of Senator Hansen).
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These are real problems now because the
ruing legislation.'
institutional lenders who are asked to provide the huge sums
necessary to begin large mining operations insist on assurance
that once begun, the mining project will be allowed to finish.
Lenders have already begun to require title opinions on these
points. Faced with the uncertainty whether surface mining
will be allowed, lenders cannot obtain the assurances of continuity they need.
CONCLUSION
The minerals which the United States government reserved throughout the West are in a more uncertain status
now than ever before. Homesteaders have accepted the law
of mineral reservation as a fact of life without much thought.
Over a half-century passed with only isolated disruption of
either the surface or the mineral estates. Few land owners
conceded that their land might contain minerals. Where minerals were removed, damage rules established by the federal
legislation upheld the removal rights of miners. Now, however, plans for the imminent removal of subsurface minerals
on a large scale have brought the entire question of the reserved minerals into sharp focus again.
The legislation of the early 1900's which opened the public lands to homesteaders for agricultural settlement while
reserving the minerals to the United States for the public
benefit merely postponed a showdown over the inherent conflicts. Congress has faced the problem again and will evidently use the 1974 strip mining legislation as a second attempt to resolve the differences between land owners and
miners. The new Congressional approach promises to shift
the emphasis on ownership of rights from miners to land
owners.
The determined stand which surface owners have taken
against the strip mining of western lands has forced considerable change already. Private contests have become a weapon
271. See text accompanying notes 209, 221 supra.
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used by landowners to remove invalid mining claims from
private surface lands. Federal leasing programs have adopted
stringent restoration requirements. State laws in the West
have also established strict reclamation standards. The trend
in all areas of the law is to require much more restoration effort and expense.
The moving force behind this change is revulsion of the
public against the effects of strip mining. The lesson is therefore clear. The mining industry must either develop economic
underground mining techniques or perfect surface restoration
methods. The public will accept no less.
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